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1 Introduction 
The process of European unification, which started with the creation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community in 1951, has slowly but surely moved into the direction of increasing economic 
and political integration. The creation of a customs union and a common market followed, and 
the adoption of a single currency in the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 was the latest 
major step (Sapir, 2011). But EMU is unlikely to be the final step. Proponents of deeper political 
integration in Europe have repeatedly argued that the European Union (EU) needs a larger 
budget and the right to levy taxes. For instance, Sijbren Cnossen argues in favour of “a federal 
government with real taxing powers and financial leverage over the Member States to mitigate 
adverse effects that might arise from Member State tax policies” (Cnossen, 2001, p. 466f). Lambert 
(2011) goes even further and develops a normative concept of an equitable EU tax redistribution 
system.  
Until recently the idea of introducing federal fiscal structures in the EU was mostly discussed in 
academic circles and think tanks but played only a minor role in the policy debate. However, the 
current debt crisis in the Eurozone has brought the idea of deeper fiscal integration to the top of 
the European policy agenda. Many observers argue that the currency union cannot survive 
unless it is complemented by a ‘fiscal union’. The concept of creating a fiscal union has many 
interpretations, ranging from the rather limited approach of introducing a set of balanced 
budget rules to the more ambitious project of creating a federal government with significant tax 
and spending powers comparable to existing federations like the US (see e.g. Bordo et al., 2011, 
Fuest and Peichl, 2012).  
While deeper fiscal integration in Europe is thus a widely debated issue, little is known about its 
economic implications. This paper contributes to filling this gap by analysing the economic 
effects of two key elements of fiscal integration, i) the introduction of an EU-wide integrated tax 
and transfer system which partly or fully replaces the existing national systems and ii) the 
introduction of a system of fiscal equalisation. These reforms would be far reaching, but they do 
reflect the widespread view that radical steps towards more fiscal integration are necessary to 
improve the stability of the Eurozone. Even if these reforms seem unlikely to find political 
support in the short term, it is important to understand why this might be the case and whether 
much is lost if fiscal integration fails to proceed into this direction.  Our analysis includes 11 
Eurozone countries.2  We employ the European tax-benefit calculator EUROMOD which uses 
harmonised and representative household micro data and allows calculating taxes, transfers and 
disposable incomes for each household type and country. EUROMOD allows us to run 
counterfactual simulations so that we can analyse policy reforms and their effects on tax 
revenues, the income distribution and labour supply. We proceed as follows. First, we construct 
                                                          
2 These are the founding members of the EMU (except Luxemburg) and include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. In the following we will refer to this group as ‘the 
EU’, neglecting that the European Union has 27 member countries. We focus on these 11 countries because of data 
availability and because we are primarily interested in studying fiscal integration in the Eurozone. 
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a European tax and transfer system, which can be interpreted as an average of the national tax 
and transfer systems. The system is designed such that it generates the same net revenue on the 
EU level but not necessarily at the level of each member state. Second, we consider various 
scenarios where the European tax and transfer system (fully or partly) replaces the national 
systems. In the first scenario, we assume that the national tax and transfer systems are reduced 
by one third and this gap is filled by the European system. In other scenarios we look at a full 
substitution of the national systems and at a more progressive European system.  
Regarding the economic impact of these reforms, we focus on two issues. Firstly, we consider the 
distributional effects of the reform scenarios, which are of key importance for the political 
feasibility of fiscal integration. The reforms lead to a redistribution of tax burdens between 
member states and across individuals, where some member states benefit and others lose. 
Within member states, households at different income levels can be affected very differently. We 
measure the redistributive effects taking into account behavioural responses in the form of 
labour supply adjustments (Bargain et al., 2012).3  
Secondly, we are interested in the impact of the different reforms on the ability of the tax and 
transfer system to act as an automatic stabiliser in the presence of macroeconomic shocks. This 
aspect is highly relevant for the debate on the role of fiscal integration for the future of the 
Eurozone. In particular, fiscal integration is expected to improve the resilience of the Eurozone 
in the event of asymmetric shocks. Building on Dolls et al. (2012), we study simulated shocks on 
gross income and we investigate to which extent the existence of the European tax and transfer 
system contributes to macroeconomic stabilisation. We are especially interested in a scenario 
where individual countries are unable to let automatic stabilisers of the national tax and transfer 
system work because they cannot borrow. In this case the automatic stabilisers of the European 
tax and transfer system are of key importance.  
Our analysis leads to the following results. The introduction of a European tax and transfer 
system which replaces one third of the national systems would increase the disposable income 
of a small majority of households in Europe. At the same time it would lead to significant 
redistribution between countries. The winners include Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and, 
surprisingly, Germany. The average gains range between roughly 8 per cent of disposable 
income in Greece and one per cent in Germany. The gains in the southern European countries 
come at the cost, however, of a decline in labour supply. Austria, France, Ireland and the 
Netherlands lose on average. The finding that Germany benefits, is surprising, because 
intuitively, one would expect gains and losses to be driven by differences in income levels 
between countries. This is true up to a point, but the structure of the existing tax and transfer 
systems plays a role as well. In France, for instance, average per capita income is lower than in 
Germany but the national tax and transfer system is less progressive than the German one and 
relies more on indirect taxes than on income taxes. Within countries, households at different 
                                                          
3
 Note that the simulation model we are using assumes full benefit take-up and no tax evasion. In addition, other 
margins of adjustment than labor supply cannot be captured. This includes, but is not limited to, tax evasion or 
avoidance and income shifting. The implications of relaxing these assumptions will be discussed further below.  
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income levels are affected differently. In the southern European countries, the gains are 
concentrated among the low income quintiles. In high income countries, the high income 
quintiles gain on average. The middle class loses in many countries. We also analyse the impact 
of the reform on income inequality. Overall, introducing the EU tax system reduces EU-wide 
income inequality. In most cases, this also holds for inequality within countries. In sum however, 
these findings cast doubts on the political feasibility of the reform under consideration. While a 
small majority of EU citizens would gain, this is not true for a majority of countries. We analyse 
the implications considering current and prospective voting mechanisms of the Council of the 
European Union.  
How does the introduction of the EU tax-benefit system affect automatic fiscal stabilisers? 
Unsurprisingly, the reform will increase automatic stabilisers in countries where the national tax 
systems have smaller stabilisers compared to the European average – this applies in particular 
to the southern European countries. A key question is by how much the EU tax and transfer 
system contributes to overall fiscal stabilisation. In the case where the EU tax and transfer 
system replaces one third of the national system, the EU system would absorb between 10 per 
cent (Ireland) and 15 per cent (Germany) of a shock to gross income. In the case of the more 
progressive EU tax system, the stabilisation properties remain similar. 
Finally, what are the implications of introducing a system of fiscal equalisation, rather than a 
common tax and transfer system? Note that with this scenario, the national tax and transfer 
systems stay in place and tax revenues are now redistributed across countries. The fiscal 
equalisation system we consider compensates countries for differences between their national 
and the EU average taxing capacity. As those differences are fully equalised, the redistributive 
effects are considerable. As one would expect, the system implies transfers flowing from high to 
low income countries.  
How does this system of fiscal equalisation perform when it comes to providing stabilisation in 
the event of an asymmetric shock? We consider a shock in the form of a decline in gross income 
by 5 per cent which hits Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland (the ‘GIIPS’ group). In all other 
countries, income remains constant. Interestingly, in terms of the stabilisation effects it offers, 
the fiscal equalisation mechanism performs rather poorly. In Greece, fiscal equalisation even 
leads to a destabilising effect. In Portugal, the stabilisation effect is close to zero. The reason is 
that, in the situation before the shock, Greece and Portugal are the countries which benefit most 
from fiscal equalisation. The shock reduces their taxing capacity, but it also reduces the taxing 
capacity of the union as a whole. Since other large countries like Spain and Italy and even a net 
contributor (Ireland) are affected, the sum of money available for fiscal equalisation declines, 
and countries which benefited initially may even lose transfers. Those findings become even 
more prevalent when simulating a shock comparable to the 2008-09 recession which has hit not 
just a few but all countries under analysis. 
Our findings have important policy implications. In order to achieve significant income 
stabilisation through the introduction of an EU tax and transfer system, the magnitude of the 
simulated system would have to be considerable. Replacing one third of the national systems by 
a European system would lead to stabilisers absorbing between 10 and 15 per cent of a 
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macroeconomic shock. But establishing such a system would give rise to significant 
redistributive effects, which will make political acceptance difficult. 
The alternative of setting up a fiscal equalisation system could give rise to even larger 
redistributive effects, depending on the design of the system. But a high degree of fiscal 
equalisation does not imply that the system always offers a high degree of fiscal stabilisation in 
the presence of asymmetric shocks. The stabilisation effect may be different for different 
countries, and the example considered here shows that even a destabilising effect is possible.  
The setup of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature and the 
concept and design of a fiscal union in our simulation scenarios. Section 3 introduces the 
empirical strategy, i.e. the micro data and the tax-benefit calculator EUROMOD, the different 
scenarios as well as some descriptive information. The results are presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes.  
2 Conceptual framework and related literature 
2.1 Related literature 
The related literature about European integration in the area of fiscal policy can be divided into 
two broad areas.4 The first strand of literature focuses on the EU budget, its expenditure and its 
revenue sources. This literature discusses issues like the size and structure of the EU budget as 
well as its current revenue sources (see, e.g., Atkinson, 2002; Begg, 2005). One important issue is 
whether the EU should be allowed to levy taxes. Currently the EU is essentially financed through 
contributions from the member states. Most of the literature about EU taxes focuses on indirect 
taxes like a European VAT or an environmental tax. Other proposals include a European 
corporate income tax or, more recently, a European financial transactions tax (see e.g. Le 
Cacheux, 2007, Begg, 2011). In this literature the key arguments in favour of a European tax are 
that such a tax would increase the transparency and improve democratic control of EU policies. 
Wigger and Wartha (2003) take a different approach and develop a theoretical model which 
focuses on the interaction between tax coordination and the allocation of taxing rights between 
the national and the EU level. They argue that, in the presence of tax coordination between 
member states, giving the EU the power to tax is not desirable because the coexistence of taxing 
powers at the national and the EU level will lead to overtaxation. 
The key difference of this literature to the present paper is that none of these contributions 
looks at the quantitative economic effects of introducing a European tax while our focus is on the 
quantitative effects in terms of redistribution, labour supply, and macroeconomic stabilisation.    
The second strand of literature related to the present paper is the large body of work on the 
implications of EMU for fiscal policy integration. An important early discussion of the key issues 
                                                          
4 There is a third strand of literature which discusses the coordination and harmonisation of taxes and tariffs required 
to create a common market. This literature is surveyed, for instance, in Keen (1993). For the present paper this 
literature is less relevant because our focus is not on tax obstacles for border crossing economic activity.  
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can be found in the MacDougall Report (1977), which had the broad objective to analyse the role 
of public finances for European integration. One of the key findings of the report is that “public 
finance in existing economic unions plays a major role in cushioning short term and cyclical 
fluctuations ... there is no such mechanism in place ... between member countries and this is an 
important reason why in present circumstances monetary union is impracticable” (p.12). This 
view has been confirmed by most of the later literature on the implications of EMU for fiscal 
policy in Europe. Eichengreen (1990) compares Europe to the US and emphasises that the 
federal income tax in the US provides significant insurance against asymmetric macroeconomic 
shocks. He argues that, since regional problems are likely to be greater in Europe than in the US, 
fiscal shock absorbers would have to be significantly larger.   
Along similar lines, many economists have warned that the Euro area is too heterogeneous and 
thus far away from being an optimum currency area along the lines of Mundell (1961) and 
Kenen (1969). Therefore, the EMU will be fragile and vulnerable to economic shocks unless it is 
complemented by more fiscal integration (see e.g. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, 1992; Buiter et al., 
1993; Masson, 1996; Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998; Engwerda et al., 2002; Uhlig, 2003). 
Several authors have proposed an increase in the European budget in order to establish a 
horizontal fiscal equalisation mechanism (Italiener and Vanheukelen, 1993; Hammond and von 
Hagen, 1998; Dullien and Schwarzer, 2005; Marzinotto et al., 2011). Schuknecht et al. (2011) 
emphasise fiscal discipline and propose an independent fiscal council for the Euro area with the 
aim to improve governance and compliance. 
Some economists have taken the opposite view and argue that the ‘unprecedented divorce 
between the main monetary and fiscal authorities’ (Goodhart, 1998) also has advantages because 
it limits political influence on monetary policy (e.g. Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1998; Dixit and 
Lambertini, 2003; Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2010). However, the current debt crisis in the 
Eurozone has renewed doubts about the wisdom of this construct. Today, the view seems to 
prevail that a monetary union like the EMU cannot work without a major policy shift towards a 
fiscal union. 
2.2 What is a ‘fiscal union’? Simulation scenarios 
In the debate on reforms of fiscal institutions in the Eurozone, it is not always clear what exactly 
the term ‘fiscal union’ is supposed to mean and different people use it very differently. Fuest and 
Peichl (2012) suggest five possible elements of a European fiscal union. These are (i) fiscal rules 
for the member states as well as rules concerning policy coordination and supervision, (ii) a 
crisis resolution mechanism, (iii) a joint guarantee for government debt, (iv) a fiscal equalisation 
and/or other mechanisms for transfers between countries and (v) an extended EU budget and 
European taxes.  
While much of the current political debate focuses on short term crisis management and 
therefore emphasises elements (i) - (iii), the focus of this paper is on elements (iv) and (v), 
which are more relevant in the long term.  
Of course, a significant shift of policy responsibilities to the European level raises many 
questions in terms of construction and how the central budget is used. More precisely, one key 
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question is how the fiscal equalisation mechanism combined with a European income tax will 
function. In order to choose scenarios for the type of a fiscal union we are going to model, we 
distinguish three dimensions which serve as a framework for the specific design of a European 
tax-benefit system: (1) overall revenue, (2) the design of the EU tax and transfer system and its 
share in overall taxes and transfers and (3) the assignment of revenues and the existence of a 
fiscal equalisation mechanism. 
First, for overall revenue, we assume our reforms to be revenue neutral at the EU level. This 
choice appears to be a natural solution for two reasons. First, it ensures the comparability of 
different scenarios. Second, by keeping the overall budget constant, we avoid the debate about 
increasing (decreasing) the size of government. This, however, does not imply revenue 
neutrality at the national level, as will be discussed further below. 
Second, for the design of the EU tax-benefit system, several approaches are possible in principle. 
The system could be designed from scratch. A simple way of doing so would be to introduce an 
EU tax surcharge, where the surcharge could simply be a percentage of national income tax 
payments. But this approach raises various difficulties. Most importantly, since national income 
tax systems differ widely across member states, such a system would benefit countries with low 
income taxes, and it would create incentives for individual member states to rely more on 
revenue sources other than income taxes like e.g. social insurance contributions or replace 
transfers by tax credits which reduce income taxation.  
Therefore, we consider the introduction of a separate tax and transfer system which would 
partly or fully replace the national systems. What we will use here is an ‘average system’ which 
leads to the same revenue and progressivity at the EU level as a combination of the existing 
national systems. At least with view to progressivity, this is an arbitrary choice even when 
conditioning on revenue neutrality. Thus, we will also consider a scenario that increases 
progressivity of the overall system, while again ensuring that overall revenue remains constant.  
Regarding the share of the EU system in overall taxes and transfers, a wide range of scenarios 
could be considered. At one extreme, we could assume that the EU tax-benefit system completely 
replaces national systems. However, in most existing fiscal unions, there are tax-benefit systems 
at different levels of government. For instance, in the US, two thirds of overall tax revenue are 
collected at the federal level versus one third at the state and local level. However, moving two 
thirds of the national tax and transfer systems to the EU level seems implausible. In our analysis, 
we will therefore look at two scenarios: in the first scenario the EU system replaces one third of 
the national systems; in the second scenario, the national systems are replaced entirely. Clearly, 
the latter scenario is more relevant as a theoretical benchmark whereas the former might be 
something that might happen if the EU decides to move to a federal fiscal system. 
Third, we have to make assumptions regarding the assignment of tax revenues and the existence 
of a fiscal equalisation mechanism. We do this as follows. In our simulations of the introduction 
of a European tax and transfer system, we assume that any net revenues (revenues  after taxes 
and transfers) generated by the EU system will be pooled, and each country will receive a 
transfer from this pool which is equal to the initial net revenue collected under the national tax 
systems. This assumption implies that redistribution between countries in our simulations is 
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driven by the fact that the EU average system changes the net tax burdens of households. We 
hold constant the net tax revenue each member state receives, so that the provision of public 
goods is kept constant in all countries, as are budget deficits. An alternative assumption would 
be to assume that net tax revenues are redistributed as well.  
This issue will be discussed in the simulations about fiscal equalisation. For this purpose we will 
assume that member states keep their tax and transfer systems but the EU average tax and 
transfer system will be used as an indicator of taxing capacity. Member states with a taxing 
capacity below the EU average will be recipients in the fiscal equalisation mechanism and vice 
versa. We will then investigate to which extent i) the fiscal equalisation mechanism redistributes 
income between member states compared to a situation without equalisation and ii) the fiscal 
equalisation mechanism cushions the impact of an asymmetric economic shock.  
2.3 Conceptual framework 
In this section we describe the income concept used in our simulations, we illustrate the idea of 
constructing an average tax system with a simple example and we explain how our simulations 
deal with government budget constraints. Our simulations proceed as follows. We start with 
representative micro data from each of the 11 EU member states which enter our simulations. 
Gross market income   of individual i is defined as the sum of all incomes from market 
activities: 
 =  +  +  +  +	,         (1) 
where   is labour income,   business income,  capital income,  property income, and 	 
other income. Disposable income 
  is defined as market income minus net government 
intervention  =  +  + : 

 =  −  =  − ( +  − ),       (2) 
where  are direct taxes,  employee social insurance contributions, and   are cash 
benefits (i.e. negative taxes). Note that, due to a lack of micro data, we cannot include indirect 
taxes and in-kind benefits in our analysis. In the following, we refer to the difference between 
taxes and social insurance contributions paid and transfers received as net taxes. 
For an illustrative example of a common tax and transfer system, assume two countries A and B 
with individual net tax schedules  = (). To keep the example as simple as possible, 
consider a linear progressive net tax schedule independent of characteristics  , i.e.  =
() =  −   with  the marginal tax rate and   a refundable tax credit (equal to a benefit 
if  is negative). A simple way to introduce a revenue neutral common tax system is to use the 
average system 
 =  !"# !#$ =
"#
$  −
!"!#
$ ,       (3) 
i.e. applying the average marginal tax rate and tax credit. In reality, tax-benefit systems do not 
only depend on income but on other characteristics, too. In addition, the observed tax-benefit 
systems are directly progressive. We therefore construct the EU average tax and transfer system 
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using a regression approach as described in section 3.2, but the economic intuition is as in our 
simple example.  
How do we take into account the government budget constraints in our simulations? Assume 
that country A has  citizens with characteristics (, &), and country B has ' citizens with 
characteristics (', &'). Under the national tax and transfer systems, the national government 
budget constraint of country k (k=A,B) in period t is given by 
∑ *+,-./ + *0 − * = *         (4) 
where ∑ -*1-./  is revenue from ‘net taxes’ (income taxes and social insurance contributions net 
of transfers), *0  is revenue from other taxes like consumption taxes or corporate income taxes, 
*	is the budget deficit and * is public expenditure excluding transfers. This would include 
spending on defence, infrastructure, police, education and other public services, but also interest 
payments on government debt.  
In the following, we omit the time index t to keep the notation simple. Equations (4) holds in the 
reference scenario in our simulations – a scenario with no supranational tax and transfer 
system. In this reference scenario the aggregate disposable income of the citizens of country k 
(k=A,B) is given by 
∑ 
* = ∑ (* − *+,./
+,
./ ).         (5) 
Now assume that both countries form a union and define a common tax and transfer system 
denoted by 34 = 34(, 5). In the following, we denote by 34* the net tax payment that arises 
if the common tax system is applied to citizen i residing in country k (k=A,B). This tax system is 
constructed so that, for the union as a whole, and for given market incomes, it generates the 
same net tax revenue as the national tax systems:	∑  + ∑ -' = ∑ 34 + ∑ -34'+#-./
+
./
+#
-./
+
./ . 
In the next step, countries A and B reduce their national net taxes by a factor 1 − 7 and fill the 
gap by introducing the common tax system. As a result aggregate disposable income of the 
citizens of country k (k=A,B), becomes ∑ 
* = ∑ (* − (1 − 7)* − 734*)+,-./
+,
./ .  
So far, we have assumed that market incomes remain constant. But the reform of the tax and 
transfer system will affect market incomes because it affects labour supply. Denote the market 
income of individual i residing in country k before the reform by *8  and market income after the 
reform by */ . Then the change in aggregate disposable income of citizens of country k, 
∑ [
*/ − 
*8+,-./ ] can be expressed as 
∑ [
*/ − 
*8+,./ ] = ∑ [*/ − *8 − [(1 − 7)*;*/ , 5<=> − 734;*/ , 5<=> − *;*8 , 5<=>]]
+,
./  (6) 
In our analysis, we focus on the change in disposable income as an indicator of whether 
countries or individuals benefit or lose from a reform.5 What are the factors driving changes in 
                                                          
5
 Here one may object that welfare should be used as an indicator because more labour supply may increase 
disposable income but not welfare. We use disposable income because this is a widespread and easily understandable 
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disposable income in different countries? Firstly, countries where the national tax and transfer 
system implies a low net tax burden compared to the European average will suffer a loss in 
disposable income as a result of the reform simply because European taxes are higher. Secondly, 
low income countries will tend to experience an increase in disposable incomes because they 
benefit from the fact that they now share a tax and transfer system with richer taxpayers in 
other countries. Thirdly, changes in disposable income will occur as taxpayers adjust their 
labour supply.   
How does the reform affect overall tax revenue and the budget constraints of the national 
governments? Consider first the impact on the national budgets. National net tax revenue 
changes for two reasons. Firstly, the national tax and transfer system is cut by a factor 1 − 7. 
Secondly, the net revenue generated by what remains of the national system changes due to 
labour supply adjustments. The change in net tax revenue collected by country k due to the 
reform is given by 
∑ [*/ − *8+,./ ] = ∑ [(1 − 7)*;*/ , 5<=> − *;*8 , 5<=>]
+,
./      (7) 
The net revenue collected by the common tax system, which we denote by ?34, is given by 
?34 = 7[∑ 34;/ , 5<@>+./ +∑ 34;-'/ , 5AB>]
+#
-./ .      (8) 
This net tax revenue collected at the European level is equal to the net revenue the national 
governments lose by abolishing a share 7 of their national tax and transfer systems if market 
income is constant. The reason is that the new tax system was designed to assure revenue 
neutrality ex ante, before labour supply adjustments. Without changes in labour supply, the tax 
revenue collected at the European level would be exactly sufficient to compensate the 
governments of the member states for their net tax revenue losses (or gains). No further 
adjustments to balance the government budgets would be required: The variables ‘other’ taxes 
(0), the budget deficits (B) and expenditures on public services (E) could be the same before 
and after the reform 
But since we do take into account changes in labour supply caused by the reform, revenue 
neutrality ex post is not guaranteed. The net revenue collected by the common tax system may 
differ from the revenue required to compensate the national governments for the changes in 
their net tax revenue. Assume that the European budget nevertheless compensates the national 
governments for the changes in national net tax revenue caused by the reform, after labour 
supply adjustments. In this case, the European budget constraint can be written as 
34 = ∑ [/ − 8+./ ] + ∑ ['/ − '8
+#
-./ ] − ?34      (9) 
where 34 is the deficit (or, if negative, surplus) in the EU level budget. A deficit 34 > 0 arises 
in the European budget if the reform leads to behavioural adjustments which reduce EU-wide 
net tax revenue. In contrast, if EU-wide net tax revenue increases, the EU budget would be in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
indicator, but we will also report results for welfare changes as well as disposable income changes without labour 
supply adjustments. The pattern of the results is the same for all indicators. 
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surplus. If there is a deficit, the question arises how that deficit is financed and how the burden 
is distributed across countries. Likewise, if there is a surplus, this money can be distributed to 
the national governments. As we will show in the simulations, this effect is quantitatively so 
small that it can be neglected.6 
 
3 Empirical strategy 
3.1 EUROMOD: model and database 
In order to analyse the hypothetical introduction of a EU-wide tax-benefit system, we need to 
run counterfactual simulations. We use the microsimulation technique to calculate taxes, 
benefits and disposable income under different scenarios for a representative micro-data 
sample of households. Simulation analysis allows conducting a controlled experiment by 
changing the parameters of interest while holding everything else constant. Therefore, the 
researcher does not have to deal with endogeneity problems when identifying the effects of the 
policy reform under consideration. 
Simulations are carried out using EUROMOD, a static tax-benefit model for the EU countries, 
which was designed for comparative analysis. Through a common framework, which has a 
greater flexibility than typical national models to accommodate a range of different tax-benefit 
systems, it allows the comparison of countries in a consistent way. EUROMOD was originally 
created in the late 1990s, by a consortium of research institutions from each EU15 country with 
a good knowledge and expertise in their respective national tax-benefit systems. The tax-benefit 
systems included in the model (1998 and 2001 for the EU-15, 2003 for a subset of countries and 
2005 for four new member states) have been validated against aggregated administrative 
statistics as well as national tax-benefit models (where available), and the robustness has been 
checked through numerous applications (see, e.g., Bargain, 2007). 
The model can simulate most direct taxes (especially income taxes on all sources of income 
including tax credits, payroll taxes and social insurance contributions) and benefits (e.g., welfare 
benefits and social assistance, housing benefits, family and child benefits) except those based on 
previous contributions as this information is usually not available from the cross-sectional 
survey data used as input datasets. Information on these instruments is taken directly from the 
original data sources. While simulations are usually carried out for counterfactual situations, 
EUROMOD also simulates various taxes and transfers for the baseline that are not observed in 
the original data.  
Information on consumption is missing in the data; hence indirect taxes as well as taxes on 
corporate profits are not included in the model. The same is true for in-kind benefits. Clearly, 
                                                          
6
 In the different scenarios the deviations from revenue neutrality range between a surplus of 0.44 Euros per 
household and week to a deficit of 0.64 Euros per week. Table C2 in the appendix reports these numbers as a 
percentage of net tax payments. 
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these elements differ between countries and affect the results presented. Table A.1 in the 
Appendix reports the shares of taxes which are captured by the model for the different 
countries. Clearly, these shares vary across countries - between 44 per cent (Ireland, Portugal) 
and 66 per cent (Germany). We do not find a systematic relationship between these shares and 
our results. In addition, the table contains information about the deficit and debt ratios for each 
country. In our analysis we do not impose a balanced budget rule and hence keep these initial 
conditions fixed. 
EUROMOD assumes full benefit take-up and tax compliance, focusing on the intended effects of 
tax-benefit systems, which may influence the results in terms of the redistributive and 
stabilizing effects of fiscal reforms when this behaviour varies substantially across countries. 
The main stages of the simulations are the following. First, a representative micro-data sample 
of individuals in households (including information on gross income from various sources as 
well as demographic characteristics which are relevant to determine taxes and benefits such as 
household size, age and number of children, marital status, employment status, disability status, 
region of living; see also below) and the respective tax-benefit rules (e.g. for singles or couples) 
are read into the model. Then for each tax and benefit instrument, the model constructs 
corresponding assessment units (for instance the individual, family or household), ascertains 
which are eligible for that instrument and determines the amount of benefit or tax liability for 
each member of the unit (for instance accounting for the individual or joint assessment of taxes 
or benefits for each household member). Finally, after all taxes and benefits are simulated, 
disposable income is calculated. This simulated disposable income includes all monetary 
incomes, except capital gains and irregular incomes.7  
Due to data limitations, our analysis is based on the 2001 tax-benefit systems, two years after 
the introduction of the Euro for the EURO-12 countries.8 This is important to keep in mind, 
especially given that many countries implemented significant reforms in their tax and transfer 
systems in the last decade. The input datasets for these countries are summarised in Table A.2 in 
the Appendix. The sample sizes vary across countries from 7,000 to more than 25,000 
households. All monetary variables are updated to the 2001 year using country-specific uprating 
factors, as the income reference period varies from 1999 to 2001. 
3.2 Scenarios 
In this section we explain in a more technical manner how we conduct the simulations of the 
different reform scenarios introduced in Section 2.2. We proceed in four steps. 
                                                          
7 For further information on EUROMOD, see Sutherland (2007). There are also country reports available with detailed 
information on the modelling and validation of each tax benefit system, see 
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod. 
8
 Unfortunately, this is the most recent year for which all countries and data is available. For later years, Germany and 
France would be missing. At the time of writing this paper, a more recent version of Euromod for the EU-27 countries 
is being constructed. 
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1. We use EUROMOD, which contains an exact representation of the (direct) tax-benefit 
systems of the Eurozone countries in 2001, to extract net taxes for each individual (and 
household) i in representative samples for each country c. In particular, EUROMOD 
simulates the country specific net taxes (income and payroll taxes minus benefits) 
E = E() as a function of gross market income   and a vector of non-income factors   (e.g. marital status, number and age of children) taken from the data. 
2. Using those simulated net taxes E  for all European citizens, we obtain the average EU 
tax function ,34! such that it yields the same net revenue at the EU level as the sum of 
the national systems. In order to calculate this average system, we adopt a regression 
approach and estimate the following reduced form tax function on the pooled sample:  
E = F34() + G.        (10) 
Function 34 is specified as a flexible transformation of () → E. G  is the OLS 
residual and F the household sample weight. We use a very flexible functional form with 
higher order polynomials and interaction terms of income and basically all 
characteristics observed in the data which are relevant for taxes and benefits (such as 
gross income from various sources, household size, age and number of children, marital 
status, employment status, disability status, region of living). Table A.3 in the Appendix 
reports the mean values of the main variables in each country. Given that weights sum 
up to the EU population size this function directly accounts for a population weighted 
average tax function at the EU level. The fit of this tax regression in terms of the R2-
measure is close to 1. It is not equal to 1, though, because by regressing on the pooled 
sample, differences across countries will be explicitly captured, which is exactly the 
differences we need to keep for the average system.  
3. The estimated function is then used to predict net tax payments for the EU average tax 
system ,34! for each individual and household in the sample.  
4. Next, we use the predicted EU average tax system to construct different scenarios of 
replacing the national tax-benefit systems with an EU-wide system (again, yielding the 
same revenue on the EU-level, but not for each country). In principle, a continuum of 
scenarios for introducing a fiscal union is possible. We focus on two different tax 
systems. We either replace the current national systems 1! with the EU average system 
34! or with a system ,34!_J with increased progressivity compared to ,34! 
(again yielding revenue neutrality).9 The latter scenario can be seen as a proxy for a 
switch towards a more “Northern” European system with higher progressivity. For both 
                                                          
9 Precisely, we calculate KLM_N by first introducing a proportional surcharge of 7.5% to KLMwhich subsequently 
will be fully redistributed across all households in the pooled sample via a lump sum transfer equal to its mean value 
across households, i.e. ,34!_J = ,34! + ,34! ∗ 0.075 − R with R = /+∑ ,34!
+
./ ∗ 0.075 Results for a 
surcharge of 5% (10%) are qualitatively in line with the results presented here and simply less (more) pronounced 
with view to the expected effects when increasing progressivity for the EU average system (detailed results available 
upon request). 
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systems, we simulate two different weighted combinations of the current national 
system and the EU average system resulting in a total of four different scenarios. Here, 
we simply look at full integration (the share of the average system is 100%) and a partial 
integration (which could be seen as a first step for such a major reform) of 33%. The 
benchmark is the current national system of each country (i.e. the share of the average 
system is 0%). Formally, we calculate for each household i of country c 
 = S,34! + (1 − S)E;S ∈ V/W , 1X.
10
      (11) 
Subsequently, the four scenarios are labelled EUavg-Sc. 1, Sc. 2 and EUavg_p-Sc. 1, Sc. 2. Figure 1 
plots the current national tax-benefit function as well as the two EU average functions. While the 
EU average function is, by construction, basically identical to the average of the national systems, 
the increased progressivity for the second function becomes visible especially at the top of the 
distribution. 
Fig. 1: EU average tax-benefit schemes and average of national systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are the general implications of this approach with view to the resulting new tax-transfer 
systems of the different countries? By construction and as described in Section 2.3, we assume 
that all of the revenue collected from 34! as well as 34!_J goes to the central EU budget 
(which remains unchanged) and is immediately redistributed across countries and households 
(note that the tax function based on the pooled sample predicts household net tax payments as a 
fraction of the central budget, not as a fraction of national budgets). The structure of national 
                                                          
10 For	S = $W, results are qualitatively similar and lie in between the results for S =
/
W	and S = 1. We thus do not report 
these results due to lack of space. 
-
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
n
et
 
ta
xe
s
0 .5 1 1.5
gross income
T EUavg
T EUavg with increased progressivity
T nat average
Note: Based on overall means for gross income deciles; weekly thousand 2001 EUR.
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
 
14
budgets is affected in the sense that the importance of the simulated elements is reduced 
according to the weighting factor (1 − S). In the extreme scenario with S = 1 it is decreased to 
zero and fully replaced by the EU system. This leads to redistribution of (simulated) net tax 
revenues between countries. This also implies that revenues and expenditures which are not 
captured by our data – like revenues from indirect or corporate income taxes or expenditures on 
defence and other publicly provided goods, as well as deficit (or surplus) levels – remain 
constant for each country. Especially the absence of a balanced budget in the analysis is 
important since, following the recent crisis, fiscal consolidation and the size of governments 
have become central to the debate on fiscal reforms in Europe.11 In principle, countries with a 
deficit (surplus) would need to raise more (less) revenue – or spend less (more) on benefits – 
and hence the households in those countries would, c.p., lose (gain) in terms of disposable 
income. 
 
Figure 2 includes plots of the current national tax-benefit functions as well as the two EU 
average functions for each country in the sample. It is immediately evident that the 
redistributive effects of the different reforms under consideration will differ between countries. 
In some cases the EU average function is always below (above) the national tax-benefit system 
and sometimes there are crossings. Hence, different parts of the income distributions will be 
affected differently. A first visual inspection suggests that low income households in Greece and 
Portugal as well as high income households in Belgium, Finland and Germany will gain, while 
especially high income households in France, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain will pay higher 
taxes. 
 
                                                          
11
 It would be, in principle, possible to increase or decrease the revenues from each country but then the question is 
how this should be achieved (e.g. in a proportional or progressive manner). This would then have additional 
distributional and stabilizing effects which are not in the focus of the present paper. Hence, we abstract from 
modelling changes to the fiscal position of each country in our analysis. 
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Fig. 2: National tax-benefit schemes compared to EU average systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Descriptive information 
In this section we report descriptive information on the variables used in our simulation 
exercise as well as for the estimated tax reform scenarios. We report values of these variables at 
the overall EU level as well as for individual countries (population share in the first column of 
Table 1). 
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Tab. 1: Weekly household gross and disposable income, benefits, SIC and taxes (2001 EUR) 
 Pop. 
share 
Gross 
income 
Disp. 
income 
Gross 
taxes 
baseline 
Gross 
SIC 
baseline 
Gross 
benefits 
baseline 
Net 
taxes 
baseline 
Net 
taxes 
EUavg 
Net 
taxes 
EUavg_p 
EU 1.00 491.0 466.4 83.6 68.9 127.8 24.7 24.7 24.7 
AT 0.03 544.3 539.9 104.0 94.1 193.6 4.5 42.2 43.5 
BE 0.04 547.2 502.2 146.1 54.0 155.1 45.0 52.7 54.8 
FI 0.02 507.9 464.4 159.3 35.0 150.8 43.5 45.5 47.0 
FR 0.21 463.7 487.3 42.9 89.1 155.6 -23.6 16.2 15.6 
GE 0.32 519.5 457.4 100.3 86.8 124.9 62.1 48.3 50.1 
GR 0.03 259.4 254.4 25.4 34.4 54.7 5.1 -59.4 -65.8 
IR 0.01 699.8 661.9 116.3 25.8 104.3 37.8 91.4 96.4 
IT 0.17 498.4 485.0 104.6 40.6 131.8 13.4 2.3 0.6 
NL 0.06 614.6 537.0 75.5 106.2 104.1 77.6 83.3 87.7 
PT 0.03 314.2 308.9 35.4 31.6 61.7 5.4 -36.4 -41.0 
SP 0.10 430.9 434.4 68.0 26.1 97.6 -3.5 -13.8 -16.7 
Note: EUavg indicates the EU average tax system, EUavg_p the same system with increased progressivity. 
We show deficit shares for 1998 additionally for those countries for which 1998 data is taken and uprated 
to 2001. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.  
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 show the average weekly gross and disposable incomes per 
household, respectively. Columns 4 to 6 include initial gross taxes, employee social insurance 
contributions (SIC) and benefits. Column 7 reports initial net taxes that is income taxes plus SIC 
paid minus cash benefits received. In France and Spain average net taxes are negative. This 
reflects that benefits paid by the government exceed revenue from income taxes and SIC. These 
countries need other revenue sources like, for instance, indirect taxes to finance transfers.  
Figure 3 illustrates how gross income is transformed into disposable income and shows that the 
structures of tax and transfer systems differ considerably across member states. For instance, in 
France income taxes play a relatively small role in financing transfers, i.e. SIC and other revenue 
sources, which are not included in our analysis, play a much more significant role than in 
countries like Germany or Belgium. 
The last two columns of Table 1 report net taxes that emerge under the EU average system 
(without and with increased progressivity in columns 8 and 9, respectively). Note that, at the EU 
level, both systems lead to the same average net tax revenue as the sum of the national systems 
in the baseline.  
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Fig. 3: Composition of 100 Euros disposable income by country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 and Figure 3 reveal that there are considerable differences across individual countries 
with respect to both income levels and the structure of the tax-benefit level. Average gross 
income ranges from almost 700 Euros in Ireland, which is 42 per cent above the EU average of 
491 Euros, to a value of 259 Euros in Greece, just 52 per cent of the EU average. One should note, 
however, that these income levels are not adjusted for differences in purchasing power. If 
differences in purchasing power are taken into account, income differentials are somewhat 
smaller12. Initial net taxes also differ considerably, between 76 Euros in the Netherlands and -24 
Euros in France. Under a common tax system, the EU average system, net taxes would change 
significantly. In the Netherlands they would increase to 83 Euros while the countries with the 
largest net transfers would now be Greece (-59 Euros) and Portugal (-36 Euros). This is 
plausible because these countries have the lowest gross income levels. In the EU average system 
with higher progression these effects are reinforced, as one would expect. 
                                                          
12
 This leads to slight changes when recalculating the results presented in section 4 for PPP-EUR. The main difference 
is that Spain now shows a majority of gainer households for the reforms considered while the rest of the findings are 
qualitatively broadly in line with the results presented here, i.e. for not PPP-adjusted 2001 EUR (detailed results 
available upon request).  
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4 Results: Economic effects of a ‘fiscal union’ 
In this section we present and discuss the key results of our simulated policy scenarios. The 
results are presented in five subsections. Section 4.1 focuses on the impact of introducing the 
common EU tax system on the distribution of income. We consider the four scenarios described 
in the previous section (share of the EU average system of 33.3% and 100%, respectively, with 
and without increased progressivity). Throughout the analysis, behavioural effects in the form of 
labour supply adjustments are accounted for. In the Appendix we summarise these effects 
(Table C.2) and we also report results without behavioural adjustments (Table B.1). 
In Section 4.2, we look at changes in inequality and a measure of social welfare which takes into 
account inequality as a welfare reducing factor. For instance, a country with significant income 
redistribution in its national system might not find a reform which increases average disposable 
income of its households beneficial if this comes at the cost of an increase in inequality. 
Subsequently, changes for income quintiles in the different countries are considered. In section 
4.3, we are interested in whether a majority of voters benefits or loses because this may affect 
political feasibility.  
Section 4.4 investigates the potential of the EU average tax system to act as an automatic fiscal 
stabiliser in presence of an asymmetric shock, compared to that of the current national tax-
benefit systems. While by construction, fiscal stabilisation is provided as a sum of national and 
EU average stabilisation (in the scenarios where the EU system does not take over 100%), we 
also look at the sole stabilisation effect of the EU average system. This is relevant in cases where 
countries are credit constrained at the capital market, as is currently the case for some countries 
in the Eurozone. 
Finally, Section 4.5 turns to the issue of fiscal equalisation. There we propose a system of fiscal 
equalisation which is based on differences in taxing capacity across countries. We calculate 
transfers between countries that would be generated by this type of system and we consider a 
scenario where a subset of countries – the GIIPS group – is affected by a negative 
macroeconomic shock. We then calculate to which extent a fiscal equalisation mechanism would 
provide insurance against this type of shock as well as against a shock comparable to the 2008-
09 recession. 
4.1 Changes in disposable income and labour supply  
We report the effects on disposable income accounting for labour supply effects which we 
discuss first. We follow van Soest (1995) or Hoynes (1996) and estimate a structural discrete 
choice labour supply model by specifying consumption-leisure preferences in a very flexible way 
(and without imposing separability between consumption and leisure). The model is estimated 
from the micro data and then used to predict the potential effects of a switch to the European 
system. The labour supply model is described in detail in Appendix C, where also estimated 
elasticities (Table C.1) as well as the labour supply effects (Table C.2 for the full population and 
Tables C.3 and C.4 for subgroups) are reported. 
The labour supply effects are negative in all winner countries except Germany and Finland. For 
instance, in Greece and Spain overall labour supply falls, measured in full time equivalents, by 
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more than 2 per cent. However, in countries, where the most significant income losses occur, 
labour supply effects are mostly positive, except for Ireland and Austria. Most substantial 
reactions are observable for women in couples and single females, which corresponds to the 
relatively high labour supply elasticities for this group as reported in Table C.1 in the Appendix. 
For Austria, women in couples are the only group reducing their labour supply due to the 
reform, which determines the direction of overall change in labour supply. For Germany, single 
men are the only group reacting negatively to the introduction of the average system which 
might reflect a substitution effect for those who initially worked full- or over-time and now 
benefit from a reduced progressivity compared to the German tax-benefit system. For all other 
countries the direction of overall labour supply effects and those for the subgroups is the same, 
though, with substantial differences in magnitudes. Particularly large negative responses can be 
observed for married and single women in Greece and Spain. For Greece, this will be partly due 
to substitution effects initiated by the substantial increases in transfers while for Spain this 
might reflect both, a substitution effect for those experiencing a shift in disposable income due to 
more generous benefits and an income effect for higher income earners suffering from increased 
progressivity (see also again Figure 2).  
How does the introduction of the common tax and transfer system redistribute income between 
households in Europe? Table 2 summarises information on changes in disposable income for all 
four scenarios. The first column for each scenario simply reports the fraction of winners in terms 
of changes in disposable income – for the EU as a whole as well as for each country. While this 
information does not account for the size of gains or losses (an increase in disposable income by 
one cent already constitutes a winner), the average size is given in the second column for each 
scenario. Even if a country shows a majority of winners (losers) it might be the case that the 
average gain (loss) of the winners (losers) is lower than the average loss (gain) of the losers 
(winners). This additional information is summarised in the last two columns for each scenario.  
As can be seen from Table 2, a partial introduction (EUavg - Sc. 1) of the EU average system leads 
to a slight majority of winners at the EU level (while weekly disposable income on average 
slightly decreases and the average loss is higher than the average gain for the first scenario). The 
share of winners increases again slightly when moving to full integration (EUavg - Sc. 2). Note 
that, by construction, the shares of losers and winners do not change over these two scenarios in 
case of fixed labour supply (Table B.1 in the Appendix). Therefore the change in the fraction of 
winners/losers can only be due to behavioural responses. At the level of the individual member 
states, a majority of winners is given in 6 out of 11 countries, namely Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain and, perhaps surprisingly, Germany as well as Finland which is only slightly above the 
margin with 51% gainers – in Belgium it is 50-50. In Spain and Germany, average gains in 
disposable income are rather small (they are zero in Finland). As one would expect the gains in 
terms of disposable income are largest in Greece, on average more than 8 per cent, and Portugal 
(4.5 per cent). The most significant income losses occur in Austria, Ireland and France, where 
average disposable incomes decline by between 2 and 3 per cent.  
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Tab. 2: % gainers, overall %-change, mean gain and loss in weekly disposable income (2001 EUR) 
  EUavg – Sc. 1 EUavg – Sc. 2 EUavg_p – Sc. 1 EUavg_p – Sc. 2 
  %+ %dY Gap+ Gap- %+ %dY Gap+ Gap- %+ %dY Gap+ Gap- %+ %dY Gap+ Gap- 
EU 55 0.0 19.9 -23.6 56 0.5 60.0 -70.5 53 0.0 21.1 -23.8 54 0.4 63.8 -70.8 
AT 35 -2.2 17.2 -28.3 36 -6.5 51.1 -85.0 32 -2.4 18.7 -27.7 33 -6.8 54.7 -83.0 
BE 50 -0.3 19.2 -22.3 51 -0.5 58.0 -66.6 44 -0.5 19.1 -19.8 46 -1.2 56.6 -59.1 
FI 51 0.0 19.1 -19.6 53 0.7 57.1 -58.6 49 -0.1 18.4 -19.3 51 0.1 54.9 -57.4 
FR 31 -2.8 14.5 -26.5 32 -7.9 42.5 -78.6 30 -2.8 17.3 -26.9 31 -7.9 51.0 -79.6 
GE 66 1.0 20.0 -24.5 68 3.6 60.7 -74.0 64 0.8 19.3 -23.2 66 3.0 58.7 -69.6 
GR 80 8.5 30.8 -12.7 80 26.1 93.6 -38.2 79 9.3 34.0 -13.4 80 28.8 103.4 -40.5 
IR 28 -2.7 21.2 -33.8 29 -7.6 63.3 -98.4 28 -3.0 25.6 -38.0 29 -8.2 76.5 -109.9 
IT 63 0.9 19.6 -21.8 63 2.8 59.7 -65.8 62 1.0 21.7 -22.1 62 3.3 66.1 -66.6 
NL 40 -0.6 16.8 -16.5 41 -1.3 50.1 -47.4 38 -0.9 19.9 -20.6 39 -2.2 59.0 -58.9 
PT 68 4.5 29.4 -17.9 69 13.6 87.8 -54.0 67 5.0 33.0 -18.6 67 15.0 99.2 -55.7 
SP 60 0.9 20.1 -20.2 61 3.1 61.0 -60.8 59 1.1 23.2 -21.3 61 4.0 70.1 -63.5 
Note: %+ is the percentage of reform gainers (100 minus %+ is the percentage of reform losers); 
%dY the overall %-change in household weekly mean disposable income; Gap+ (Gap-) the mean 
difference from zero for positive (negative) dY. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. 
 
An interesting aspect of this result is that intuitively, one would assume that the rich countries 
systematically lose in a common system. This is only partly true. It is particularly puzzling that 
Germany and France are affected very differently, with France losing significantly although its 
average income is lower. The explanation for this finding is that the national tax and transfer 
systems of these two countries are very different, despite their similarity in other dimensions. 
Inspecting Figure 2 shows that, indeed, the EU tax system implies higher taxes and lower 
transfers than the French national system. This implies that the net tax burden on the French 
population increases. In addition, French income levels are close to the EU average, so that the 
country cannot hope to benefit from participating in a system with higher average incomes. 
Figure 5 shows that in France the low income quintiles suffer more than the high income 
quintiles. In Germany, however, the situation is different. The national tax and transfer system is 
characterised by higher progressivity and slightly higher taxes for high income earners. For 
lower income levels, the distance between the national and the EU tax and transfer system is 
rather small. As a result, all quintiles in Germany gain from the introduction of the EU tax. 
The general pattern of results in terms of losers and winners at the country level (as well as in 
terms of the direction in labour supply responses) is robust when switching to the EU average 
tax system with an increase in tax progressivity (EUavg_p - Sc. 1, Sc. 2). The numbers of winners 
and losers change slightly, as do the magnitudes of average gains and losses. But – except for the 
case of partial integration where Finland now has slightly less gainers (49%) than losers - no 
country shows a shift from a majority of losers to a majority of winners or vice versa. 
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4.2 Effects on welfare and inequality 
Changes in inequality due to the redistributive effects of tax-benefit reforms will also be a 
relevant indicator to policy makers. Therefore, Table 3 additionally reports the Gini coefficient 
across countries as well as its percentage change due to the introduction of the different 
scenarios. Next, this information is integrated with the change in disposable income into a social 
welfare function (SWF) of the Yitzhaki-type (Yitzhaki, 1979), i.e. Y = Z ∗ (1 − ) with	Z the 
mean disposable income of the respective population and G the accordant Gini index.13 
Table 3 reveals that, at least in the first two scenarios, the pattern of winner and loser countries 
does not change when looking at welfare instead of disposable income, i.e. it is again the same 
group of countries - Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (but not Finland) - that benefits 
in terms of the percentage change in social welfare. Inequality also declines in the EU as a whole, 
as well as in all individual countries except Belgium and Finland. Greece is again the country that 
benefits most, showing the largest decrease in the Gini coefficient (having the highest level of 
initial inequality). When moving to the average system with increased progressivity, the overall 
pattern again does not change (minor changes can be observed for Finland and the 
Netherlands). However, as can be expected, decreases (increases) in inequality (increases 
(decreases) in welfare) become stronger (less strong or even negative) compared to the 
scenarios without increased progressivity. 
 
Tab. 3: Gini-Index (G, %-changes dG) and Welfare (W, %-changes dW) 
  Baseline EUavg – Sc. 1 EUavg – Sc. 2 EUavg_p – Sc. 1 EUavg_p – Sc. 2 
  G W dG dW dG dW dG dW dG dW 
EU 0.34 315 -3.2 1.7 -6.4 3.8 -4.5 2.4 -10.5 6.0 
AT 0.31 382 -0.4 -2.1 3.5 -7.9 -1.8 -1.6 -1.2 -6.3 
BE 0.33 347 1.8 -1.2 8.1 -4.4 0.1 -0.6 2.9 -2.6 
FI 0.34 315 1.0 -0.5 5.1 -2.0 -0.4 0.1 1.2 -0.6 
FR 0.31 343 -2.1 -1.9 -2.4 -6.9 -3.5 -1.2 -6.9 -5.0 
GE 0.33 323 -2.8 2.4 -5.5 6.3 -4.4 3.0 -10.3 8.2 
GR 0.42 151 -12.8 18.4 -27.4 50.7 -14.3 20.5 -29.8 56.2 
IR 0.36 432 -1.3 -2.0 -3.1 -6.0 -2.4 -1.7 -6.2 -5.1 
IT 0.37 307 -4.0 3.2 -9.5 8.6 -5.2 4.1 -13.0 11.2 
NL 0.31 391 -1.1 -0.1 -2.2 -0.3 -2.4 0.2 -5.9 0.3 
PT 0.40 191 -8.0 10.1 -16.3 25.9 -9.4 11.5 -18.7 29.3 
SP 0.37 281 -4.5 3.5 -10.9 9.6 -5.7 4.4 -14.1 12.5 
  Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. 
                                                          
13
 In Appendix D, we show that the results do no change when aggregating the individual utilities from the labor 
supply model using a utilitarian SWF. 
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Related to that, Figure 4 shows the share of winners within gross income quintiles of the overall 
sample population by scenario. The effects are rather similar for all quintiles of the overall EU 
income distribution. The effect of increased progressivity becomes visible as well: the share of 
winners increases with higher progressivity for quintiles 1 and 2 while for the fourth and the 
fifth quintile, it is the share of losers that increases. 
 
Fig. 4: Share of winners in global quintiles by reform scenario  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This can be compared to the share of winners within gross income quintiles for the different 
scenarios by countries in Figure 5. The left (right) panel displays the 6 (5) countries which on 
average suffer (benefit) from the EU tax reforms (with switching countries Belgium and Finland 
on the left hand side). Consider first the countries which benefit on average. In the four southern 
European countries, low income quintiles benefit most because the transfers in the EU system 
are more generous than the transfers in the national systems. In Italy and Spain high income 
quintiles mostly lose. In Germany, the pattern is different. The share of winners is slightly higher 
in the middle to upper quintiles than in the lower ones. This pattern can also be observed for 
Austria, Belgium and Finland. In France, Ireland and the Netherlands, the losses mostly fall on 
the high income quintiles. 
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Fig. 5: Share of winners in country gross income quintiles by scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Political Feasibility 
The introduction of a common tax and transfer system in Europe would be a major reform, and 
generating political support for such a project would be difficult. This section tries to provide 
some insights into how difficult this might be by discussing how redistributive effects of the 
reform could translate into voting behaviour at the national and at the European level. In order 
to do this we make the following assumptions. Firstly, if a majority of taxpayers in a country 
benefits from a reform in terms of changes in disposable income, we assume that the 
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government of this country will support the reform when it comes to voting at the European 
level, independently of the extent of gains and losses.  
Secondly, we assume that decisions at the European level will require qualified majorities. 
Currently, decisions of the Council of the European Union in tax matters would usually require 
unanimity, which implies that none of the reforms we consider will be implemented unless side 
payments are possible. But as political integration in Europe proceeds, it may well be that the 
role of decisions by qualified majority increases.  
We consider two voting rules for Council decisions which can currently be found in the EU 
Treaties. The first rule has been established with the Lisbon Treaty and is supposed to be in 
practice from 2014 on. It is referred to as the ‘double majority rule’. This rule states that a 
qualified majority decision requires support of at least 55 per cent of the member states and, in 
addition, a positive vote of member states representing at least 65 per cent of the population. 
The second rule is stipulated in the Treaty of Nice and currently in force. This rule has three 
elements. It requires a simple majority of the member states and support of member states 
representing at least 62 per cent of the population. In addition, this rule uses voting weights that 
have been given to countries to reflect size differences. Here, the required quorum is 74 per cent. 
Table 4 illustrates this for the two groups of countries we consider, the larger group of 11 
countries and the smaller ‘core union’ consisting of 5 countries.14   
We focus on scenarios EUavg –Sc.1 and EUavg_p –Sc.1. In sum we find that would be difficult to 
generate the required political support for the two reforms under consideration. In the case of 
scenario 1, we observe a narrow majority of countries in favour of the reform, i.e. 6 versus 5 
votes. This simple majority represents 67 per cent of the population. Thus, the reform would 
pass under the double majority rule of the Treaty of Lisbon. With the Treaty of Nice rule, 
however, the reform would be rejected. It fails to achieve the required majority under weighted 
voting (116 versus 139 votes). Surprisingly, for the smaller core union, the reform would fail 
under both rules. This reflects the results for and the political weight of France. The same holds 
true for both groups of countries for the scenario with increased progressivity. 
 
                                                          
14
 The results in terms of the EU average tax system for changes in disposable income as well as inequality and 
welfare are reported in Appendix E. A general pattern which seems to be consistent across various different 
combinations of countries for the core union is that, as long as the reform is revenue-neutral, there will always be 
winner and loser countries as there will be redistribution between countries. Which countries will win and lose will 
depend, among other things on where the households are situated in the European income distribution. Hence, there 
does not seem to be a combination of countries which will unambiguously favor the introduction of a fiscal union. 
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Tab. 4: Political implementability of EUavg - Sc. 1 and EUavg_p – Sc. 1 using different voting rules 
 EUavg - Sc. 1 EUavg_p – Sc. 1 
 Eurozone Core Union Eurozone Core Union 
 +/- Pop. Votes +/- Pop. Votes +/- Pop. Votes +/- Pop. Votes 
AT - 0.03 10 - 0.04 10 - 0.03 10 - 0.04 10 
BE - 0.04 12 + 0.05 12 - 0.04 12 + 0.05 12 
FI + 0.02 7 + 0.03 7 - 0.02 7 + 0.03 7 
FR - 0.21 29 - 0.31 29 - 0.21 29 - 0.31 29 
GE + 0.32 29 + 0.48 29 + 0.32 29 + 0.48 29 
GR + 0.03 12    + 0.03 12   12 
IR - 0.01 7    - 0.01 7   7 
IT + 0.17 29    + 0.17 29   29 
NL - 0.06 13 - 0.09 13 - 0.06 13 - 0.09 13 
PT + 0.03 12    + 0.03 12   12 
SP + 0.10 27    + 0.10 27   27 
SUM 11 1.00 187 6 1.00 100 11 1.00 187 6 1.00 100 
Lisb. 6 0.65  4 0.65  6 0.65  4 0.65  
Nice 6 0.62 139 4 0.62 74 6 0.62 139 4 0.62 74 
SUM+ 6 0.67 116 3 0.56 48 5 0.65 109 3 0.56 48 
Note: A qualified majority according to the Treaty of Nice requires a simple majority of member states + 
74 per cent of the votes + 62 per cent of the population (on demand of one member); the Treaty of Lisbon 
requires 55 per cent of the member states + 65 per cent of the population being represented. 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. 
These results suggest that a move towards a common tax and transfer system would be unlikely 
to happen even if qualified majority rules were applied to reforms as fundamental as the 
introduction of a common tax and transfer system. Clearly, from a political economy perspective, 
the resistance of those who would lose from moving to fiscal union can only be overcome if 
something can be offered to the losers to compensate them. To make this possible, the reform 
would either have to be linked to other issues, or it would have to generate significant benefits 
beyond those considered so far in the analysis. One possible source of benefits would be an 
improvement in macroeconomic stability through automatic fiscal stabilisers. This issue will be 
analysed in the next section. 
 
4.4 Automatic fiscal stabilisation 
What is the impact of introducing the EU system on the ability of the tax and transfer systems to 
act as an automatic stabiliser? Automatic fiscal stabilisation is associated with the ability of taxes 
and transfers to stabilise income and in consequence consumption automatically in the face of 
economic downturns. The stabilising character of the tax and transfer system relies on a simple 
mechanism: In the presence of a given negative shock to gross income, taxes decline and 
transfers increase, so that the decline in disposable income is smaller than the shock to gross 
income. Several components of government budgets are impacted by the macroeconomic 
situation in ways that operate to smooth the business cycle, with progressive income taxes and 
unemployment benefits being the most prominent example. Automatic stabilisation might have 
effects not only on disposable income but also on GDP itself. If in a recession fewer taxes are 
collected and more transfers are paid, this should support private incomes and dampen adverse 
movements in aggregate demand.  
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Of course, cushioning of shocks through taxes and transfers comes at the cost of an increase in 
the government budget deficit. The usual assumption is that this gap is closed through debt 
financing. However, in the current Eurozone debt crisis, some countries have lost access to 
private capital markets so that they need outside help to close the gap in the government budget. 
We will return to this issue further below. 
The extent to which automatic stabilisers mitigate the impact of income shocks on household 
demand essentially depends on the tax and transfer system which determines the way in which 
a given shock to gross income translates into a change in disposable income. For instance, in the 
presence of a proportional income tax with a tax rate of 40%, a shock on gross income of 100 
Euros leads to a decline in disposable income of 60 Euros. In this case, the tax absorbs 40% of 
the shock to gross income. A progressive tax, in turn, would have a stronger stabilising effect 
(van den Noord, 2000; Girouard and André, 2005).  
A common measure for estimating automatic stabilisation is the “normalised tax change” used 
by Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) which can be interpreted as “the tax system’s built-in 
flexibility” (Pechman, 1973, 1987). Based on this idea, in Dolls et al. (2012) define the “income 
stabilization coefficient” [ which shows how changes in market income (defined as the sum of all 
incomes from market activities such as (self)-employment, business and property income) 

\	translate into changes in disposable income (market income minus taxes plus benefits) 

]	through changes in net tax payments G. They extend the concept of normalised tax change to 
include other taxes as well as social insurance contributions and transfers like e.g. 
unemployment benefits. We follow their approach and take into account personal income taxes 
(at all government levels), social insurance contributions as well as payroll taxes and transfers 
to private households such as unemployment benefits. τ is computed using arithmetic changes 
(Δ) in total disposable income (∑ ∆
] ) and market income (∑ ∆
\ ) based on household micro 
level information: 
[ = 1 −	 ∑ ∆_
`
∑ ∆_a
= ∑ (∆_
a ∆_`)
∑ ∆_a
.        (12) 
In order to compute the coefficients of automatic stabilisation, we compute their income shock 
measure defined as a proportional decrease of gross income by 5% for all households. The 
results are presented in Table 5. The levels and differences across countries in the baseline 
scenario are in line with the calculations in Dolls et al. (2012). 
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Tab. 5: Automatic fiscal stabilisation (income shock 5%) 
  EUavg EUavg_p 
 Baseline Sc. 1 Sc. 1cc Sc. 2 Sc. 1 Sc. 1cc Sc. 2 
EU 0.40 0.40 0.13 0.40 0.41 0.15 0.45 
AT 0.43 0.43 0.14 0.42 0.44 0.15 0.45 
BE 0.51 0.45 0.11 0.34 0.46 0.12 0.37 
FI 0.42 0.42 0.14 0.42 0.44 0.16 0.47 
FR 0.36 0.38 0.14 0.41 0.39 0.15 0.45 
GE 0.49 0.47 0.15 0.44 0.48 0.16 0.48 
GR 0.29 0.30 0.11 0.34 0.31 0.12 0.36 
IR 0.38 0.36 0.10 0.31 0.38 0.13 0.38 
IT 0.34 0.35 0.12 0.37 0.38 0.15 0.46 
NL 0.40 0.41 0.14 0.43 0.42 0.15 0.46 
PT 0.30 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.31 0.11 0.34 
SP 0.30 0.32 0.12 0.36 0.33 0.13 0.39 
Note: Sc. 1cc indicates credit constraints for countries. 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. 
 
When moving towards a EU tax-benefit system, most countries gain in terms of automatic 
stabilisation – except Belgium and Germany, which are the countries with the highest automatic 
stabilisers in their national tax and transfer systems, as well as Ireland. In the case of a fully 
integrated system (Sc. 2), these patterns are enforced. The qualitative results are rather similar 
for the scenarios with increased progressivity. The low income, southern European countries 
have significantly higher stabilisers in the progressive system. We can thus conclude that a more 
progressive EU tax system does not necessarily increase automatic stabilisers for all countries. 
For the high income countries, the opposite may occur.  
How does an EU tax-benefit system cushion asymmetric shocks in individual countries? In the 
case of full integration, this cushioning is given by the stabilisation coefficient for Sc. 2 
independent of a single country’s access to credit markets. The stabilisation coefficient in the 
case of partial integration, where only a third of the national tax and transfer systems is replaced 
by the European system, is a combination of the national and European tax and transfer systems 
and given in column Sc. 1. But if the individual countries are credit credit-constrained, they 
cannot let the automatic stabilisers work. Instead they would have to adjust taxes or 
expenditures to keep the budget balanced. In this case automatic stabilisation can only come 
from the European tax and transfer system where the assumption is that the EU budget deficit 
can be financed by issuing debt. Hence, we re-compute the stabilisation coefficient for this case 
(Sc. 1cc). The values for the income stabilisation of the coefficients range between 0.1 for Ireland 
 
28
and 0.15 for Germany and are at approximately one third (i.e. its share) of the EU average 
system. In the case of the more progressive EU system, the automatic stabilisers slightly increase 
for all countries. On average, the automatic stabilisers of the EU budget would absorb 
approximately 15 per cent of an income shock. This illustrates that even a rather radical reform, 
which replaces one third of the national tax and transfer systems by a supranational system, 
would have only rather moderate fiscal stabilisation effects in the event of country specific 
shocks.  
4.5. Fiscal Equalisation  
We now turn to the second element of a fiscal union in our analysis, the introduction of a fiscal 
equalisation mechanism. Fiscal equalisation, in contrast to the creation of a common tax and 
transfer system, leaves the national tax and transfer systems in place but redistributes tax 
revenue across countries. This redistribution is based on the hypothetical ability of a country to 
generate tax revenue, to which we refer as its taxing capacity. In existing fiscal equalisation 
systems this is a common approach (see e.g. Boadway, 2004, or Büttner, 2006). We define the 
taxing capacity of a country as the net tax revenue a country would raise if it fully applied the ‘EU 
average’ tax and transfer system used in the preceding section (compare Table 1, column ‘Net 
taxes EUavg’). This taxing capacity can be interpreted as an indicator of the amount of tax 
revenue that could be raised by a country if tax rates and transfers were set as in other countries 
and serves as the basis for equalisation payments. Countries above (below) the average taxable 
capacity will pay (receive) transfers to (from) the equalisation mechanism. This setup can be 
interpreted as a simple version of a European ‘transfer union’. Note that the scenario considered 
here is quite ambitious in that the fiscal equalisation scenario fully compensates for differences 
in taxing capacity. In practice one might expect a more moderate system which would 
compensate countries for a share of the differences in taxing capacity only. 
It is clear that in such a system, a country as a whole either gains or loses, depending on whether 
the country is a net donor or recipient of fiscal equalisation payments. The distribution of taxes 
and transfers within a country, however, is less straightforward. For simplicity, and in order not 
to alter existing redistribution within a country, we assume that the equalisation of taxes and 
transfers are shared among households proportionally to existing net tax payments. What are 
the implications for automatic stabilisation properties of the tax and transfer system? Table 6 
shows the net tax payments in the baseline as well as for the EU average system which serves as 
our measure of taxable capacity. The resulting fiscal equalisation payments are reported in 
column 3 (a positive (negative) value indicates a net contributing (receiving) country). Column 4 
includes the new distribution of net taxes.  
Consider first the direct cross country distributional effect of the fiscal equalisation system. As 
one would expect, the high income countries are net contributors to the system. Contributions 
per household range from 66.7 Euros in the case of Ireland to 17.5 Euros in Austria. These are 
huge contributions, equivalent to 9.6 per cent of gross income in Ireland and 3.2 per cent of 
gross income in Austria. Clearly, these unrealistically large contributions reflect the fact that the 
degree of fiscal equalisation is 100 per cent. Accordingly, the countries with below average 
taxing capacity receive huge transfers. The recipients include Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and 
France. In Greece the fiscal equalisation payment is equal to 84 Euros, an implausible 33 per cent 
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of average gross income. France receives the lowest payment per household, just 8.5 Euros, 
which equals 1.7 per cent of average gross income. 
What are the implications of this system for automatic stabilisers? As long as governments can 
cushion income shocks by increasing debt financing, the stabilisers in the system are the same as 
under the national systems. But things are different if governments cannot borrow without 
restrictions. Consider an asymmetric shock in the form of a decline in gross incomes by 5% 
which hits the periphery of the Eurozone, i.e. the GIIPS countries. This corresponds to a 2% 
shock at the EU level (column 5). The shock leads to a reduction in the net tax payments 
collected in the affected countries (column 6) as well as a reduction in their taxable capacity 
(column 7). As a result, the fiscal equalisation payments for all countries have to be adjusted 
(column 8) resulting in a new distribution of net taxes (column 9). Finally, column 10 reports the 
automatic stabilisation effect of the fiscal equalisation scheme in the affected countries. It 
measures the change in fiscal equalisation payments as a percentage of the change in income 
caused by the shock. Negative values of dAS imply that payments received from the fiscal 
equalisation scheme decline in response to the negative shock or contributions a country has to 
make to the scheme increase, so that a destabilising effect arises. 
 
Tab 6: 5% asymmetric shock to GIIPS countries with fiscal equalisation mechanism 
 Net Net Fiscal Fiscal Gross New net New net New New dAS 
 taxes taxes eq. eq. income taxes taxes fiscal. fiscal fiscal 
 baseline EUavg  taxes shock % nat. EUavg eq. eq. taxes eq. 
EU 24.5 24.5 0.0 24.5 2 22.0 22.0 0.0 22.0 7 
AT 4.5 42.2 17.5 22.0 0 4.5 42.2 20.1 24.6 0 
BE 45.0 52.7 28.0 73.0 0 45.0 52.7 30.6 75.6 0 
FI 43.5 45.5 20.8 64.3 0 43.5 45.5 23.4 66.9 0 
FR -23.6 16.2 -8.5 -32.1 0 -23.6 16.2 -5.9 -29.5 0 
GE 62.1 48.3 23.6 85.7 0 62.1 48.3 26.2 88.3 0 
GR 5.1 -59.4 -84.1 -79.1 5 1.1 -61.9 -84.0 -82.9 -1 
IR 37.8 91.4 66.7 104.5 5 23.3 77.4 55.3 78.6 33 
IT 13.4 2.3 -22.4 -9.0 5 4.5 -7.0 -29.1 -24.6 27 
NL 77.6 83.3 58.6 136.2 0 77.6 83.3 61.2 138.8 0 
PT 5.4 -36.4 -61.1 -55.7 5 0.5 -40.2 -62.3 -61.8 8 
SP -3.5 -13.8 -38.5 -42.0 5 -9.8 -21.1 -43.2 -53.1 22 
Note: Monetary values are in weekly 2001 EUR. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. 
 
Maybe the most striking result is that the fiscal equalisation system may have a destabilising, 
rather than a stabilising impact on some of the countries hit by the shock. In our scenario this 
applies to Greece, the country most favoured by the initial fiscal equalisation system. Although 
its fiscal capacity declines as a consequence of the shock, the payment it receives from the fiscal 
equalisation system declines slightly. The payment received by Portugal is almost unchanged. 
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Only the countries which are closer to average taxing capacity experience a stabilising effect in 
the form of higher fiscal equalisation payments. The reason is that the shock has two effects on 
each affected country. Firstly, the taxing capacity of the country declines. Other things equal, this 
increases equalisation payments. But there is a second effect. Since other countries are affected 
by the shock, too, overall taxing capacity in the union declines as well. This reduces fiscal 
equalisation payments for all receiving countries. Together these two effects may imply that 
individual countries hit by the shock may end up receiving lower payments, so that the fiscal 
equalisation scheme has a destabilising, rather than a stabilising effect. 
 
Tab 7: 2008-2009 shock to all countries with fiscal equalisation mechanism 
 Net Net Fiscal Fiscal Gross New net New net New New dAS 
 taxes taxes eq. eq. income taxes taxes fiscal. fiscal fiscal 
 baseline EUavg  taxes shock % nat. EUavg eq. eq. taxes eq. 
EU 24.5 24.5 0.0 24.5 4 14.8 15.0 0.0 14.8 -8 
AT 4.5 42.2 17.5 22.0 4 -5.0 32.0 17.0 12.0 2 
BE 45.0 52.7 28.0 73.0 3 36.0 46.1 31.0 67.0 -18 
FI 43.5 45.5 20.8 64.3 8 24.4 26.3 11.2 35.7 23 
FR -23.6 16.2 -8.5 -32.1 3 -28.1 10.2 -4.8 -33.0 -26 
GE 62.1 48.3 23.6 85.7 5 47.8 35.5 20.5 68.3 12 
GR 5.1 -59.4 -84.1 -79.1 3 2.7 -60.9 -76.0 -73.2 -105 
IR 37.8 91.4 66.7 104.5 7 17.6 71.8 56.7 74.3 20 
IT 13.4 2.3 -22.4 -9.0 6 2.7 -8.9 -23.9 -21.2 5 
NL 77.6 83.3 58.6 136.2 4 65.9 70.8 55.8 121.7 11 
PT 5.4 -36.4 -61.1 -55.7 3 2.4 -38.6 -53.7 -51.3 -78 
SP -3.5 -13.8 -38.5 -42.0 4 -8.6 -19.7 -34.7 -43.3 -22 
Note: Monetary values are in weekly 2001 EUR. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. 
Changes in GDP from OECD. 
 
This issue becomes even more relevant when considering a more extreme shock scenario, as the 
recent economic crisis. Therefore, we take the observed reduction in GDP for all 11 countries 
under analysis from 2008 to 2009 (4 per cent on average). All countries experienced a 
substantial reduction in GDP in that period, ranging from 3 to 8 per cent. In such a situation, the 
average taxing capacity substantially declines on the EU level from 24.5 Euros per household 
before to 15 Euros per household after the shock. Consequently, the fiscal equalisation payments 
after the shock substantially decrease for Greece, France, Spain and Portugal. As a result, all of 
those countries experience a significant destabilising effect (the exception is Italy, where fiscal 
equalisation payments once again increase). This effect is most striking for Greece, where 
payments received from the scheme fall by more than 100 per cent of the income shock. 
However, now also one of the donor countries faces a destabilising effect. While in the former 
scenario, Ireland as the only donor country was hit by a shock, but had to contribute less to the 
equalisation system and thus, experienced a stabilising effect, Belgium has to contribute more to 
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the system in the situation after the crisis. Clearly, the effects reported seem unrealistically large. 
This is again due to the assumption that the mechanism fully equalizes taxing capacities across 
countries. Also, all countries experience a large shock to gross income at the same time in this 
scenario. This necessarily undermines the overall redistributive capacity of the mechanism. 
Nevertheless, such a scenario emphasizes the finding from the previous analysis, i.e. that a fiscal 
equalisation mechanism can have a destabilising effect.  
 
5 Conclusions 
The current debt crisis in the Eurozone has brought the idea of deeper fiscal integration to the 
top of the European policy agenda. Many observers argue that the currency union cannot 
survive unless it is complemented by a ‘fiscal union’. In this paper, we have analysed the 
economic effects of two important elements of fiscal integration, i) the introduction of an EU-
wide integrated tax and transfer system which partly or fully replaces the existing national 
systems and ii) the introduction of a system of fiscal equalisation.  
Our analysis shows that the introduction of an EU tax and transfer system would increase the 
disposable income of a small majority of households in Europe. At the same time it would lead to 
significant redistribution between countries. In Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and, surprisingly, 
Germany, a majority of household would benefit and average disposable income would increase. 
But in the remaining six countries, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland and the 
Netherlands, a majority would lose. In many of the high income countries including Germany, 
the middle income quintiles fare worse as a result of the reform than households at the two ends 
of the income distribution. Choosing a more progressive variant of the EU tax system would 
change the magnitudes of gains and losses, but the patterns would be similar. All this suggests 
that generating political support for such a reform may be difficult.  
Another key question is how the introduction of the EU tax-benefit system would affect 
automatic fiscal stabilisers in the different member countries. In the case, where the EU tax and 
transfer system replaces one third of the national systems, the EU system would absorb between 
10 per cent (Ireland) and 15 per cent (Germany) of a shock to gross income. In the case of the 
more progressive EU tax system, the stabilisation properties changes only slightly. Given that 
replacing one third of the existing national tax and transfer systems by an EU system seems 
rather ambitious, and given that the more progressive system has stronger redistributive effects, 
which may reduce its political viability, this may seem disappointing.  
Regarding the implications of introducing a system of fiscal equalisation, our findings are even 
less appealing. We consider a system of strong fiscal equalisation, where differences between 
the taxing capacity of individual countries and average EU taxing capacity are fully neutralised. 
Unsurprisingly, this system leads to a massive transfer of tax revenue from high to low income 
countries. These redistributive effects are much larger than those of introducing the common tax 
and transfer system, at least in the scenarios without increased progressivity, but the 
achievements in terms of macroeconomic stabilisation in the presence of asymmetric shocks are 
disappointing. For some countries, the fiscal equalisation mechanism even has a destabilising 
effect. An important policy implication of this analysis is that it is important to distinguish 
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between the redistributive effects of steps towards fiscal integration and its stabilisation effects 
in the presence of an asymmetric macroeconomic shock.  
These results should be interpreted in the light of the limitations of our analysis and the 
simplifying assumptions we have made. Most importantly, we should emphasise that our 
simulations focus on particular scenarios, and although we have looked at different variants of 
the reforms to explore robustness, the results do depend on the specific properties of the 
reforms we have considered, and other reforms will have different effects. This also applies to 
the macroeconomic shock scenarios we have analysed. We have focused on proportional income 
shocks which affect all households equally, but macroeconomic shocks often affect households 
very differently. As shown in Dolls et al. (2012), the impact of automatic fiscal stabilisers 
depends on the type of shock. We have also neglected the impact of reforms on indirect taxes 
and government expenditure other than monetary transfers. In addition, we have abstracted 
from a balanced budget in the analysis.  
Note also that our analysis abstracts from a number of behavioural effects apart from potential 
labour supply reactions that were taken into account. First, we did not account for other margins 
like tax evasion or avoidance or income shifting. In addition, we did not take into account 
differences in the size of the shadow economy and the enforcement and collection of taxes 
across countries. Hence, given that there are considerable differences across countries, an 
important element of introducing a common tax system would be to address the issue of equal 
tax administration and enforcement. If one assumes that tax evasion is higher in countries with 
lower incomes, our simulations would underscore the degree of redistribution from high to low 
income countries caused by the introduction of a common tax system. Second, we have 
abstracted from potential effects of tax harmonisation on cross country migration. For instance, 
more generous transfers to households in poor income countries could prevent them from 
migrating to high income countries if they are unemployed. Among other things, this would 
make adjustment to asymmetric shocks more difficult.  
Future research should try to tackle these issues. In addition, the analysis could be extended to 
all 17 Eurozone countries or even the EU-27. However, in general, as long as the reform will be 
revenue-neutral at the EU-level, there will always be winner and loser countries. Which 
countries will win and lose will depend, among other things, on where the households are 
situated in the European income distribution and on how the (progressivity of the) EU system is 
designed. It would also be interesting to analyse some kind of optimal EU tax system in future 
research. 
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APPENDIX 
A Descriptive Data 
Tab. A.1: Taxes captured and not by EUROMOD as % of total taxation in 2001 
 Taxes captured Taxes not captured Deficit  
%GDP 
Debt 
%GDP 
 Income SIC SUM VAT Corp. SUM 
AT 23.9 32.9 56.8 33.8 6.9 40.7 0.0 66.8 
BE 30.1 31.4 61.5 29.2 7.2 36.4 0.4 106.5 
FI 31.5 26.9 58.4 30.0 9.4 39.4 5.1 42.5 
FR 18.8 36.8 55.6 35.1 7.0 42.1 -1.5 56.9 
GE 23.2 42.8 66.0 28.2 4.3 32.5 -3.1 59.1 
GR 13.6 31.9 45.5 41.5 10.1 51.6 -4.5 103.7 
IE 29.3 15.2 44.5 41.9 12.1 54.0 0.9 35.1 
IT 26.7 28.6 55.3 35.5 7.8 43.3 -3.1 108.2 
NL 16.1 35.7 51.8 33.7 11.0 44.7 -0.2 50.7 
PT 17.4 26.7 44.1 43.6 10.6 54.2 -4.8 53.5 
SP 20.2 36.1 56.3 34.4 8.5 42.9 -0.5 55.6 
Source: OECD Taxation trends in Europe. Deficit and debt shares from Eurostat. 
. 
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Tab. A.2: Data sources used by EUROMOD 
Country Data Years 
No of observations 
(original samples) 
    
Data 
collection 
Incomes 
Simulated 
policy 
Austria 
European Community 
Household Panel  
1999 1998 2001 7.386 
Belgium 
Panel Survey on Belgian 
Households  
2002 2001 2001 7.335 
Finland 
Income Distribution 
Survey  
2001 2001 2001 25.010 
France Household Budget Survey 
2000- 
01 
2000-
01 
2001 25.803 
Germany 
German Socio-Economic 
Panel  
2001 2000 2001 16.874 
Greece Household Budget Survey 1995 1994 2001 15.062 
Ireland Living in Ireland Survey  2000 2000 2001 11.436 
Italy 
Survey of Households 
Income and Wealth  
1996 1995 2001 23.924 
Netherlands 
Sociaal-Economisch 
Panelonderzoek  
2000 1999 2001 10.344 
Portugal 
European Community 
Household Panel 
2001 2000 2001 13.092 
Spain 
European Community 
Household Panel 
2000 1999 2001 14.787 
Tab. A.3: Cross-country heterogeneity in main characteristics for tax functions (2001)  
 Av. n 
HH 
Mem. 
Av. n 
Child. 
0-17 
Av. n 
Old 
65+ 
Av. 
Age 
HH 
head 
Share  
Couple 
HH 
Share 
Prop. 
Income 
Share 
Pension 
Eligib. 
Share 
UB 
Eligib. 
Share 
Self 
Employed 
EU 2.50 0.51 0.38 50.47 23.83 30.37 16.06 1.75 5.15 
AT 2.45 0.52 0.38 49.75 23.14 8.53 17.82 1.37 5.66 
BE 2.39 0.55 0.39 52.29 25.71 11.68 16.80 2.61 5.99 
FI 2.16 0.48 0.29 48.54 22.49 20.58 17.14 4.86 6.02 
FR 2.42 0.57 0.35 49.96 25.13 33.60 14.97 1.85 2.87 
GE 2.08 0.40 0.33 51.00 24.26 39.87 16.93 2.66 4.16 
GR 2.83 0.60 0.46 52.33 25.14 7.75 15.97 0.98 10.38 
IR 2.98 0.80 0.32 46.21 19.82 14.07 11.40 3.35 6.16 
IT 2.89 0.54 0.44 51.16 23.94 31.98 17.89 0.42 6.91 
NL 2.25 0.54 0.30 48.79 27.28 25.07 14.14 0.92 2.74 
PT 3.24 0.69 0.45 48.42 22.14 4.49 13.97 1.05 8.22 
SP 3.23 0.61 0.51 49.96 19.71 30.78 14.34 1.69 6.28 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.  
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B Income changes without behavioural adjustments 
Tab. B.1: % gainers, overall %-change, mean gain and loss in weekly disposable income (2001 EUR) – for 
baseline labour supply 
  EUavg – Sc. 1 EUavg – Sc. 2 EUavg_p – Sc. 1 EUavg_p – Sc. 2 
  %+ %dY Gap+ Gap- %+ %dY Gap+ Gap- %+ %dY Gap+ Gap- %+ %dY Gap+ Gap- 
EU 54 -0.1 19.8 -23.7 54 -0.1 59.5 -71.1 52 -0.1 21.1 -24.0 52 -0.3 63.3 -71.9 
AT 34 -2.3 17.4 -28.3 34 -6.8 52.0 -84.8 31 -2.4 18.9 -27.8 31 -7.2 56.7 -83.3 
BE 48 -0.4 19.3 -22.3 48 -1.2 57.9 -66.9 43 -0.6 19.1 -20.1 43 -1.8 57.4 -60.3 
FI 50 -0.1 19.1 -19.8 50 -0.2 57.3 -59.4 48 -0.3 18.6 -19.5 48 -0.7 55.7 -58.6 
FR 30 -2.8 14.7 -26.6 30 -8.5 43.9 -79.9 29 -2.8 17.6 -27.1 29 -8.5 52.9 -81.3 
GE 65 0.9 19.9 -24.7 65 2.8 59.8 -74.1 63 0.7 19.2 -23.4 63 2.2 57.6 -70.3 
GR 79 8.4 30.6 -12.7 79 25.2 91.8 -37.9 79 9.2 33.8 -13.4 79 27.6 101.5 -40.1 
IR 28 -2.8 21.3 -34.3 28 -8.4 63.8 -102.8 28 -3.1 25.7 -38.6 28 -9.2 77.1 -115.7 
IT 63 0.8 19.5 -21.7 63 2.5 58.5 -65.0 61 1.0 21.5 -22.1 61 2.8 64.5 -66.2 
NL 40 -0.6 16.9 -17.0 40 -1.9 50.7 -51.0 38 -1.0 20.0 -21.1 38 -3.0 60.0 -63.4 
PT 68 4.5 29.3 -17.9 68 13.4 87.9 -53.8 66 4.9 33.0 -18.6 66 14.8 99.1 -55.9 
SP 59 0.8 20.1 -20.2 59 2.3 60.2 -60.6 58 1.0 23.2 -21.4 58 2.9 69.5 -64.1 
Note: %+ is the percentage of reform gainers (100 minus %+ is the percentage of reform losers); 
%dY the overall %-change in household weekly mean disposable income; Gap+ (Gap-) the mean 
difference from zero for positive (negative) dY. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. 
 
C Behavioural adjustment 
We follow van Soest (1995) or Hoynes (1996) in the choice of a structural discrete choice labour 
supply model. In this framework, labour supply decisions are reduced to choosing among a 
discrete set of possibilities, e.g., inactivity, part-time and full-time. This modelling includes non-
participation as one of the options so that both the extensive margin (participation) and the 
intensive margin (working hours) are directly estimated. We assume that there are K=7 discrete 
hour possibilities for each potential worker (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 hours per week). We specify 
consumption-leisure preferences in a very flexible way (and without imposing separability 
between consumption and leisure) using a quadratic utility function as in Blundell et al. (2000). 
That is, the deterministic utility of a couple i at each discrete choice j = 1;…;J can be written as: 
K- =∝E - +∝EE -$ +∝cd e-
f +∝cg e-h +∝cdd ie-
fj
$
+∝cgg ;e-h>
$
 
+∝Ecd -e-
f +∝Ecg -e-h +∝cgcd e-
fe-h − k-
f ∗ 1(e-
f > 0) − k-h ∗ 1(e-h > 0)  (13) 
with household consumption Cij and spouses’ work hours Hfij and Hmij. The J choices for a couple 
correspond to all combinations of the spouses’ discrete hours, that is, J = 7*7=149. For singles, 
the model above is simplified to only one hour term Hij, and J is simply the number of discrete 
hour choices K=7. Coefficients on consumption and work hours are specified as: 
7E = 7E8 + lE7E + m          (14) 
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7cd = 7cd8 + l
f7cd          (15) 
7cg = 7cg8 + lh7cg ,          (16) 
i.e. they vary linearly with several taste-shifters Zi (including polynomial form of age, presence of 
children or dependent elders and region). The term 7E also incorporates unobserved 
heterogeneity, in the form of a normally-distributed term ui, for the model to allow random taste 
variation and unrestricted substitution patterns between alternatives. The fit of the model is 
improved by the introduction of fixed costs of work, estimated as model parameters. Fixed costs 
explain the fact that there are very few observations with a small positive number of worked 
hours. These costs, denoted k-*for k = f;m, are non-zero for positive hour choices and depend on 
observed characteristics (e.g., the presence of young children). 
For each labour supply choice j, disposable income (equivalent to consumption in the present 
static framework) is calculated as a function - = n(S
fe-
f , She-h, o , ) of female and male 
earnings, non-labour income yi and household characteristics Xi. The tax-benefit function d is 
simulated using EUROMOD. In the discrete choice approach, disposable income needs to be 
assessed only at certain points of the budget curve, so that nonlinear budget constraints 
resulting from nonlinear taxes, joint filing and unemployment benefits can be taken into account 
very easily. Male and female wage rates wfi and wmi for each household i are calculated by 
dividing earnings by standardized work hours. We assume that hourly wages are constant 
across the working hour categories and do not depend on the actual working time, which is 
standard in the literature. For unemployed people we estimate their (potential) hourly wages by 
using the Heckman correction for sample selection. The stochastic specification of the labour 
supply model is completed by i.i.d. error terms eij for each choice j = 1;…;J. That is, total utility at 
each alternative is written 
p- = K- + q-           (17) 
with Uij as previously defined. Error terms are assumed to represent possible observational 
errors, optimization errors or transitory situations. Under the assumption that they follow an 
extreme value type I (EV-I) distribution, the (conditional) probability for each household i of 
choosing a given alternative j has an explicit analytical solution: 
- = rsN;K->/∑ rsN(K*)u*./         (18) 
The unconditional probability is obtained by integrating out the disturbance terms (unobserved 
heterogeneity in preferences) in the likelihood. In practice, this is done by averaging the 
conditional probability Pij over a large number of draws (here 100) for these terms, so the 
parameters can be estimated by simulated maximum likelihood. 
The model is estimated separately for each country, so that estimated parameters are country-
specific. These estimates are used to calculate the probabilities of changing working time 
categories due to a marginal change in wage rates or non-labour incomes can be predicted. 
Resulting elasticities are reported in Table C.1. We see that elasticities are relatively small and 
similar across countries. Nonetheless, some country differences can be observed: these mainly 
respect differences in preferences and childcare institutions, as shown in Bargain et al. (2012). 
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Tab C.1: Estimated labour supply elasticities by subgroups 
    
  
AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
Married women                         
Wage elasticities             
Total hours   .34 .31 .13 .13 .31 .62 .32 .33 .32 .14 .51 
Intensive margin (hour) .05 .05 .01 .02 .08 .03 .05 .05 .13 .05 .08 
Extensive margin (particip.) .27 .23 .12 .10 .22 .57 .27 .28 .20 .11 .43 
Income elasticity             
Total hours   -.0011 -.0018 .0010 -.0023 -.0057 -.0039 -.0069 .0010 -.0008 .0000 .0004 
Extensive margin (particip.) -.0008 -.0012 .0010 -.0016 -.0038 -.0035 -.0071 .0009 -.0008 .0000 .0003 
Married men                         
Wage elasticities             
Total hours   .07 .12 .10 .06 .14 .11 .15 .04 .06 .04 .08 
Total hours (compensated) .07 .12 .10 .06 .14 .11 .16 .05 .06 .04 .08 
Intensive margin (hour) .02 .02 .00 .02 .03 .01 .03 -.01 .01 .03 .07 
Extensive margin (particip.) .05 .09 .10 .04 .11 .10 .12 .05 .06 .03 .07 
Income elasticity             
Total hours   -.0003 -.0019 .0010 -.0004 -.0036 -.0047 -.0036 -.0168 -.0017 -.0001 -.0024 
Extensive margin (particip.) -.0001 -.0011 .0010 .0001 -.0022 -.0034 -.0022 -.0129 -.0008 .0000 -.0016 
Single women                         
Wage elasticity             
Total hours   .14 .59 .21 .12 .18 .41 .37 .67 .16 .08 .20 
Intensive margin (hour) .01 .07 .00 .02 .01 -.01 .06 .05 .02 .04 .04 
Extensive margin (particip.) .13 .41 .20 .09 .17 .43 .24 .58 .11 .05 .19 
Income elasticity             
Total hours   -.0006 -.0038 .0287 .0011 -.0061 -.0102 -.0025 .0189 -.0034 -.0002 -.0072 
Extensive margin (particip.) -.0003 -.0016 .0278 .0023 -.0026 -.0092 -.0012 .0187 -.0020 -.0002 -.0053 
Single men                           
Wage elasticity             
Total hours   .14 .28 .33 .14 .20 .19 .67 .22 .08 .03 .57 
Intensive margin (hour) .05 -.01 -.01 .02 .01 .05 .03 .02 .01 -.02 .09 
Extensive margin (particip.) .08 .27 .34 .12 .21 .15 .62 .22 .08 .04 .47 
Income elasticity             
Total hours   -.0003 -.008 .112 -.002 -.007 -.0002 -.028 -.003 -.003 .000 -.012 
Extensive margin (particip.) -.0001 -.005 .104 .000 -.003 -.0001 -.021 .000 -.001 .000 -.012 
Note: wage (income) elasticities are computed numerically as the responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates 
(unearned income). The intensive margin corresponds to the response in work hours among workers, the extensive 
margin to the participation response (measured either in % change in participation rate).Source: Own calculations based 
on EUROMOD, see also Bargain et al. (2012). 
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The model is used to predict a change in disposable income induced by the EU tax reform. The 
expected working hours for each individual as well the whole population are calculated after 
implementation of the reform. Results are reported in Table C.2. The first row shows results for 
the whole sample of countries while subsequently, figures on the national level are presented. 
 
Tab. C2: Mean hours worked, fulltime equivalents (FTE) and %-changes in labour supply 
(FTE) –singles and couples (N=30382)  
 Baseline 
Hours worked 
Reform scenarios 
Change labour supply (FTE) in % 
 Mean/ FTE EUavg EUavg_p 
 week in Mio. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 1 Sc. 2 
EU 29.9 71.1 -0.1 -1.0 -0.6 -2.6 
AT 32.0 2.1 -0.1 -0.9 -0.6 -2.2 
BE 32.7 2.6 2.5 5.6 1.8 3.7 
FI 33.2 1.7 2.0 4.6 1.6 3.6 
FR 30.8 17.3 0.5 1.3 0.3 0.6 
GE 30.0 23.5 0.4 0.0 -0.3 -2.3 
GR 25.3 1.3 -3.1 -10.2 -3.7 -12.1 
IR 28.1 0.7 -1.3 -4.7 -1.8 -6.6 
IT 26.7 8.4 -1.4 -4.9 -1.9 -6.6 
NL 31.3 5.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -1.7 
PT 34.5 2.0 -0.3 -1.2 -0.5 -2.0 
SP 27.7 6.4 -2.4 -8.0 -2.9 -9.9 
 net taxes base relative change in net taxes  
EU 26.3 1.8 -2.4 0.5 -2.6 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. 
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Tab. C.3: Fulltime equivalents (FTE) and %-changes (FTE) –single men and women 
 Single men Single women 
  EUavg EUavg_p EUavg EUavg_p 
 SQ Sc.1 Sc.2 Sc.1 Sc.2 SQ Sc.1 Sc.2 Sc.1 Sc.2 
EU 7.8 0.3 -1.3 -0.4 -3.7 8.1 0.5 0.4 -0.3 -2.2 
AT 0.3 0.8 1.8 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.1 -0.9 
BE 0.2 6.0 9.6 5.3 7.9 0.2 7.7 17.5 6.2 14.1 
FI 0.2 5.3 13.5 4.5 11.4 0.2 3.0 7.7 2.5 6.5 
FR 1.6 2.6 6.1 2.2 5.0 2.0 2.5 7.6 2.2 6.7 
GE 3.5 -0.4 -3.4 -1.3 -6.6 3.2 0.4 -0.3 -0.7 -3.8 
GR 0.1 -1.4 -4.8 -1.7 -5.8 0.1 -9.7 -27.9 -11.0 -31.5 
IR 0.1 -1.7 -8.0 -3.1 -12.4 0.1 -1.3 -5.1 -2.1 -7.8 
IT 0.6 -1.1 -3.6 -1.7 -5.6 0.7 -3.9 -13.4 -5.2 -18.0 
NL 0.5 1.3 2.6 1.0 1.8 0.5 2.5 6.1 2.0 4.6 
PT 0.1 -0.1 -1.4 -0.4 -2.3 0.2 -1.6 -5.3 -2.1 -7.0 
SP 0.6 -4.9 -18.9 -6.3 -23.9 0.6 -3.2 -11.4 -3.8 -13.7 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. 
 
 
Tab. C.4: Fulltime equivalents (FTE) and %-changes–married men and women 
 Married men Married women 
  EUavg EUavg_p EUavg EUavg_p 
 SQ Sc.1 Sc.2 Sc.1 Sc.2 SQ Sc.1 Sc.2 Sc.1 Sc.2 
EU 37.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.8 -0.4 17.8 -0.5 -1.9 -1.1 -3.7 
AT 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.5 -1.9 -6.0 -2.7 -8.4 
BE 1.4 1.6 2.8 3.8 1.0 0.8 1.6 4.1 0.8 1.7 
FI 0.7 1.7 2.9 3.8 1.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.6 
FR 8.7 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 5.0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -1.2 
GE 11.2 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.1 5.5 0.5 0.5 -0.2 -1.6 
GR 0.9 -1.8 -4.0 -6.7 -2.2 0.3 -5.3 -15.8 -6.3 -18.7 
IR 0.4 -0.6 -1.4 -2.4 -0.9 0.2 -2.7 -8.8 -3.2 -10.8 
IT 5.1 -1.1 -2.5 -4.1 -1.4 2.0 -1.4 -4.5 -2.1 -6.7 
NL 2.9 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.4 1.3 -0.8 -2.9 -1.7 -5.5 
PT 1.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 0.7 -0.4 -1.3 -0.6 -2.1 
SP 4.0 -1.2 -2.6 -4.3 -1.5 1.2 -4.5 -13.5 -5.6 -16.5 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. 
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D Individual Welfare 
In addition to using a very simple Yitzhaki-type SWF, it would be possible to somehow aggregate 
the individual utilities from the labour supply model. This is not uncontroversial because one 
has to deal with interpersonal comparisons of preferences. The common approach adopted in 
the literature on welfare analysis in labour supply models (see e.g. Aaberge and Colombino 
2008) is to specify a representative utility function (according to estimated preferences of the 
median income household) to be the same for all individuals in one subgroup of one country.15 
Note, however, that utility functions are still country and subgroup specific and total changes 
cannot be compared across countries and/or subgroups.  
Table D.1 shows the share of gainers according to individual welfare as well as the sign of the 
total change in social welfare for single men, single women and couples for the four scenarios as 
defined above. Overall, countries are very similar affected in terms of (individual and social) 
welfare compared to the redistributive changes in income. For almost all subgroups and 
scenarios the reforms lead to a slight majority of gainers on the EU level and also to a positive 
change in social welfare. On the country level, we again observe the pattern of clear gainers (GE, 
GR, IT, PT, SP) and losers (AT, FR, IR, NL switches for single women in EUavg_p Sc.2) with two 
switching countries (BE and FI).  
 
Tab. D.1: Share winners in individual welfare (%+) and total change in social welfare (dW) 
 EUavg – Sc. 1 EUavg – Sc. 2 
  Sing m Sing f Couples Sing m Sing f Couples 
  %+ dW %+ dW %+ dW %+ dW %+ dW %+ dW 
EU 54 + 57 + 54 + 56 + 59 + 56 + 
AT 33 - 41 - 41 - 34 - 42 - 43 - 
BE 53 - 47 - 52 - 55 - 50 - 53 - 
FI 40 - 46 - 53 - 45 - 49 - 55 - 
FR 35 - 36 - 29 - 38 - 39 - 32 - 
GE 65 + 63 + 69 + 68 + 65 + 70 + 
GR 76 + 88 + 76 + 77 + 88 + 77 + 
IR 38 - 45 - 20 - 40 - 46 - 20 - 
IT 53 + 64 + 66 + 53 + 65 + 67 + 
NL 43 - 46 - 38 + 45 - 48 - 39 + 
PT 70 + 55 + 63 + 67 + 76 + 63 + 
SP 57 + 71 + 53 - 59 + 73 + 56 - 
                                                          
15
 While this approach ensures the comparability of individual welfare and thus allows performing consistent welfare 
analyses, it assumes away the preference heterogeneity that is used to estimate individual labor supply behavior. See 
Bargain et al. (2012) for an illustration of how to respect individual and cross-country heterogeneity in consumption-
leisure preferences for welfare measurement.  
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 EUavg_p – Sc. 1 EUavg_p – Sc. 2 
  Sing m Sing f Couples Sing m Sing f Couples 
  %+ dW %+ dW %+ dW %+ dW %+ dW %+ dW 
EU 54 + 60 + 50 + 56 + 62 + 52 + 
AT 29 - 44 - 33 - 30 - 45 - 36 - 
BE 50 - 48 - 43 - 52 - 50 - 43 - 
FI 42 - 51 - 48 - 45 - 53 - 50 - 
FR 35 - 40 - 27 - 37 - 42 - 30 - 
GE 65 + 67 + 62 + 68 + 69 + 63 + 
GR 77 + 89 + 75 + 78 + 89 + 76 + 
IR 39 - 48 - 20 - 41 - 49 - 20 - 
IT 56 + 68 + 63 + 55 + 68 + 64 + 
NL 39 - 53 - 32 + 40 - 56 - 34 + 
PT 70 + 55 + 61 + 67 + 78 + 61 + 
SP 58 + 73 + 51 - 60 + 74 + 54 - 
Note: %+ is the share of households in the respective subgroup experiencing a gain in individual 
welfare (100 minus %+ is the percentage of reform losers); dW reports the sign of the total change 
in social welfare. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. 
 
E Core union 
Fig. E.1: National tax-benefit schemes compared to EU average systems – core union 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tab. E.1: Weekly household gross and disposable income, benefits, SIC and taxes (2001 EUR) 
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 Pop. 
share 
Gross 
income 
Disp. 
income 
Gross 
taxes 
baseline 
Gross 
SIC 
baseline 
Gross 
benefits 
baseline 
Net 
taxes 
baseline 
Net 
taxes 
EUavg 
Net 
taxes 
EUavg_p 
EU 1.00 510.6 475.9 138.0 87.6 85.1 34.7 34.7 34.7 
AT 0.04 544.3 539.9 193.6 104.0 94.1 4.5 27.6 27.1 
BE 0.05 547.2 502.2 155.1 146.1 54.0 45.0 36.0 36.1 
FI 0.03 507.9 464.4 150.8 159.3 35.0 43.5 29.8 29.5 
FR 0.31 463.7 487.3 155.6 42.9 89.1 -23.6 0.1 -2.5 
GE 0.48 519.5 457.4 124.9 100.3 86.8 62.1 46.2 47.1 
NL 0.09 614.6 537.0 104.1 75.5 106.2 77.6 80.4 83.8 
Note: EUavg indicates the EU average tax system, EUavg_p the same system with increased progressivity. 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. 
 
Tab. E.2: % gainers, overall %-change, mean gain and loss in weekly disposable income (2001 EUR) 
  EUavg – Sc. 1 EUavg – Sc. 2 EUavg_p – Sc. 1 EUavg_p – Sc. 2 
  %+ %dY Gap+ Gap- %+ %dY Gap+ Gap- %+ %dY Gap+ Gap- %+ %dY Gap+ Gap- 
EU 54 -0.1 18.6 -22.1 55 0.3 56.1 -65.9 51 -0.1 20.0 -22.5 53 0.2 60.4 -66.5 
AT 43 -1.3 18.4 -27.2 45 -3.7 54.3 -82.9 41 -1.4 21.0 -27.3 43 -3.6 61.7 -81.9 
BE 56 0.7 19.6 -17.2 58 2.4 59.4 -51.3 52 0.6 20.9 -16.5 53 2.1 63.2 -48.6 
FI 59 1.0 20.0 -16.8 61 3.5 59.9 -50.4 57 1.0 21.4 -17.3 58 3.4 64.3 -51.3 
FR 36 -1.8 17.6 -23.8 38 -4.9 51.8 -70.7 36 -1.6 21.4 -24.5 37 -4.5 63.1 -72.5 
GE 67 1.1 18.8 -21.8 68 3.8 57.5 -65.2 64 1.0 19.0 -20.7 66 3.5 58.4 -61.9 
NL 45 -0.3 18.1 -17.7 46 -0.5 54.1 -51.2 43 -0.6 21.8 -22.3 44 -1.2 65.1 -63.7 
Note: %+ is the percentage of reform gainers (100 minus %+ is the percentage of reform losers); 
%dY the overall %-change in household weekly mean disposable income; Gap+ (Gap-) the mean 
difference from zero for positive (negative) dY. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. 
Tab. E.3: Gini-Index (G, %-changes dG) and Welfare (W, %-changes dW) 
  Baseline EUavg – Sc. 1 EUavg – Sc. 2 EUavg_p – Sc. 1 EUavg_p – Sc. 2 
  G W dG dW dG dW dG dW dG dW 
EU 0.32 338 -2.9 1.3 -5.8 3.0 -4.5 2.0 -10.4 5.1 
AT 0.31 382 -2.6 -0.2 -3.6 -2.2 -4.1 0.4 -8.5 0.0 
BE 0.33 347 -0.7 1.0 0.4 2.2 -2.6 1.8 -5.1 4.7 
FI 0.34 315 -1.5 1.8 -2.0 4.6 -3.0 2.5 -6.0 6.5 
FR 0.31 343 -3.6 -0.2 -7.1 -1.9 -5.0 0.6 -11.5 0.4 
GE 0.33 323 -3.2 2.6 -6.7 7.2 -4.8 3.3 -11.5 9.3 
NL 0.31 391 -2.1 0.6 -5.1 1.8 -3.6 1.0 -8.9 2.7 
  Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. 
Oxford University Centre for Business 
Taxation 
Working Paper series 
 
WP12/21 Peter Egger, Christian Keuschnigg, Valeria Merlo and 
Georg Wamser Corporate taxes and internal borrowing within 
multinational firms  
 
WP12/20 Jarkko Harju and Tuomos Kosonen The impact of tax 
incentives on the economic activity of entrepreneurs 
 
WP12/19 Laura Kawano and Joel slemrod The effects of tax rates 
and tax bases on corporate tax revenues: estimates with new 
measures of the corporate tax base 
 
WP12/18 Giacomo Rodano, Nicolas Serrano-Velarde and 
Emanuele Tarantino Bankruptcy law and the cost of banking 
finance 
 
WP12/17 Xavier Boutin, Giacinta Cestone, Chiara Fumagalli, 
Giovanni Pica and Nicolas Serrano-Velarde The Deep pocket 
effect of internal capital markets  
 
WP12/16 Clemens Fuest, Andreas Peichl and Sebastian Siegloch 
Which workers bear the burden of corporate taxation and 
which firms can pass it on? Micro evidence from Germany  
 
WP12/15 Michael P. Devereux Issues in the Design of Taxes on 
Corporate Profit 
 
WP12/14 Alan Auerbach and Michael P. Devereux Consumption 
Taxes In An International Setting 
 
WP12/13 Wiji Arulampalam, Michael P. Devereux and Federica 
Liberini Taxes and the location of targets 
 
WP12/12 Scott Dyreng, Bradley Lindsey and Jacob Thornock 
Exploring the role Delaware plays as a tax haven 
 
WP12/11 Katarzyna Bilicka and Clemens Fuest With which 
countries do tax havens share information? 
 
WP12/10  Giorgia Maffini Territoriality, Worldwide Principle, 
and Competitiveness of Multinationals: A Firm-level Analysis of 
Tax Burdens 
 
WP12/09 Daniel Shaviro The rising tax-electivity of US residency 
 
WP12/08 Edward D Kleinbard Stateless Income 
 
WP12/07 Vilen Lipatov and Alfons Weichenrieder Optimal income 
taxation with tax competition 
 
WP12/06 Kevin S Markle A Comparison of the Tax-motivated 
Income Shifting of Multinationals in Territorial and 
Worldwide Countries 
 
WP12/05 Li Liu Income Taxation and Business Incorporation: 
Evidence from the Early Twentieth Century 
 
WP12/04 Shafik Hebous and Vilen Lipatov A Journey from a 
Corruption Port to a Tax Haven 
 
WP12/03 Neils Johannesen Strategic line drawing between debt 
and equity 
 
WP12/02 Chongyang Chen, Zhonglan Dai, Douglas A. 
Shackelford and Harold H. Zhang, Does Financial Constraint 
Affect Shareholder Taxes and the Cost of Equity Capital? 
WP12/01 Stephen R. Bond and Irem Guceri, Trends in UK BERD 
after the Introduction of R&D Tax Credits 
 
WP11/24 Michael Devereux and Simon Loretz How would EU 
corporate tax reform affect US investment in Europe? 
WP11/23 Krautheim, Sebastian and Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr 
Wages and International Tax Competition 
WP11/22 Haufler, Andreas, Pehr-Johan Nörback and Lars 
Persson Entrepreneurial innovation and taxation 
 
WP11/21 Mancini, Raffaele, Paolo M. Panteghini and Maria laura 
Parisi Debt-Shifting in Europe 
 
WP11/20 Xing, Jing Does tax structure affect economic growth? 
Empirical evidence from OECD countries 
 
WP11/19 Freedman, Judith Responsive regulation, risk and rules: 
applying the theory to tax practice 
 
WP11/18 Devereux, Michael P. and Simon Loretz How would EU 
corporate tax reform affect US investment in Europe? 
 
WP11/17 Vella, John, Clemens Fuest and Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr 
Response on EU proposal for a Financial Transaction Tax 
 
WP11/16 Loretz, Simon and Socrates Mokkas Evidence for 
profit-shifting with tax sensitive capital stocks 
 
WP11/15 Weisenbach, david A. Carbon taxation in the EU: 
Expanding EU carbon price 
 
WP11/14 Bauer, Christian, Davies, Ronald B. and Andreas Hauer 
Economic Integration and the Optimal Corporate Tax 
Structure with Heterogeneous Firms 
 
WP11/13 Englisch, Joachim National Measures to Counter Tax 
Avoidance under the Merger Directive 
 
WP11/12 de la Feria, Rita and Clemens Fuest Closer to an 
Internal Market? The Economic Effects of EU Tax Jurisprudence 
 
WP11/11 Englisch, Joachim EU Perspective on VAT Exemptions 
 
WP11/10 Riedel, Nadine and Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch 
Asymmetric Obligations 
 
WP11/09 Böhm, Tobias and Nadine Riedel On Selection into 
Public Civil Service 
 
WP11/08 Auerbach, Alan J. and Michael P. Devereux Consumption 
and Cash-Flow Taxes in an International Setting 
 
WP11/07 Becker, Johannes and Clemens Fuest Tax Competition: 
M&A versus Greenfield Investment 
 
WP11/06 Riedel, Nadine Taxing Multinationals under Union 
Wage Bargaining 
 
WP11/05 Liu, Li and Rosanne Altshuler Measuring the Burden of 
the Corporate Income Tax under Imperfect Competition 
 
WP11/04 Becker, Johannes and Clemens Fuest The Taxation of 
Foreign Profits - The Old View, the New View, and a Pragmatic 
View 
 
WP11/03 Konrad, Kai Search Costs and Corporate Income Tax 
Competition 
 
WP11/02 Hellerstein,Walter Comparing the Treatment of 
Charities Under Value Added Taxes and Retail Sales Taxes 
 
WP11/01 Dharmapala, Dhammika and Nadine Riedel Earnings 
Shocks and Tax-Motivated Income-Shifting: Evidence from 
European Multinationals 
 
WP10/23 Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim Towards a Theory of Trade 
Finance 
 
WP10/22 Freedman, Judith and John Vella HMRC's Management 
of the UK Tax System: The Boundaries of Legitimate Discretion 
 
WP10/21 de la Feria, Rita Reverberation of Legal Principles: 
Further Thoughts on the Development of an EU Principle of 
Prohibition of Abuse of Law 
 
WP10/20 Hauer, Andreas and Frank Stähler Tax competition in a 
simple model with heterogeneous firms: How larger markets 
reduce profit taxes 
 
WP10/19 Cnossen, Sijbren Improving the VAT Treatment of 
Exempt Immovable Property in the European Union 
 
WP10/18 Grubert, Harry and Richard Krever VAT and Financial 
Supplies: What should be taxed? 
 
WP10/17 Gendron, Pierre-Pascal VAT Treatment of Public Sector 
Bodies: The Canadian Model 
 
WP10/16 Niepmann, Friederike and Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr Bank 
Bailouts, International Linkages and Cooperation 
 
WP10/15 Bond, Stephen and Jing Xing Corporate taxation and 
capital accumulation 
 
WP10/14 Lockwood, Ben How should financial intermediation 
services be taxed? 
 
WP10/13 Becker, Johannes, Fuest, Clemens and Nadine Riedel 
Corporate tax effects on the quality and quantity of FDI 
 
WP10/12 Fuest, Clemens and Nadine Riedel Tax Evasion and Tax 
Avoidance in Developing Countries: The Role of International 
Profit Shifting 
 
WP10/11 Wildasin, David E. State Corporation Income Taxation: 
An Economic Perspective on Nexus 
 
WP10/10 Becker, Johannes and Marco Runkel Corporate tax 
regime and international allocation of ownership 
 
WP10/09 Simpson, Helen How do firms' outward FDI strategies 
relate to their activity at home? Empirical evidence for the UK 
 
WP10/08 Voget, Johannes, Headquarter Relocations and 
International Taxation 
 
WP10/07 Devereux, Michael P. and Simon Loretz Evaluating 
Neutrality Properties of Corporate Tax Reforms 
 
WP10/06 Davies, Ronald B. and Lourenço S. Paz, Tarifs Versus VAT 
in the Presence of Heterogeneous Firms and an Informal Sector 
 
WP10/05 Finke, Katharina, Heckemeyer, Jost H., Reister Timo and 
Christoph Spengel Impact of Tax Rate Cut Cum Base Broadening 
Reforms on Heterogeneous Firms - Learning from the German 
Tax Reform 2008 
 
WP10/04 Koh, Hyun-Ju and Nadine Riedel Do Governments Tax 
Agglomeration Rents? 
 
WP10/03 Dischinger, Matthias and Nadine Riedel The Role of 
Headquarters in Multinational Profit Shifting Strategies 
 
WP10/02 Vrijburg, Hendrik and Ruud A. de Mooij Enhanced 
Cooperation in an asymmetric model of Tax Competition 
 
WP10/01 Bettendorf, Leon, van der Horst Albert, de Mooij, Ruud 
A. and Hendrik 
Vrijburg, Corporate tax consolidation and enhanced 
cooperation in the European Union 
 
WP09/32 Bettendorf, Leon, Devereux, Michael P., van der Horst, 
Albert, Loretz, 
Simon and Ruud A. de Mooij Corporate tax harmonization in 
the EU 
 
WP09/31 Karkinsky, Tom and Nadine Riedel Corporate Taxation 
and the Choice 
of Patent Location within Multinational Firms 
 
WP09/30 Becker, Johannes and Clemens Fuest Transfer Pricing 
Policy and the 
Intensity of Tax Rate Competition 
